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ADJUSTING TAXES FOR INFLATION:
THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC
RECOVERY TAX ACT
AHARON YORAN"
CHARLES P SHIMER"
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981' (ERTA) introduced automatic
indexing of the individual income tax structure beginning in 1985. 2 Although
indexing was part of the 1979 Kemp-Roth tax cut proposal,' neither the
Reagan administration's original proposal nor the Congressional committees'
reports provided for indexing. 4 Unlike previous bills providing for major tax
changes, little public debate -occurred regarding the various factors involved in
ERTA's indexing provisions. 2 Congress, rather, incorporated this provision
into ERTA in the final stages of debate. 6 The indexing provision, coupled with
ERTA's 1981-1984 individual tax cuts has been both portrayed and widely
perceived as a device which would eliminate "bracket creep" caused by infla-
tion.? This perception which has led to wide public acceptance of indexing
may, however, prove to be a cruel illusion to many American taxpayers. In
fact, ERTA's provisions for altering the tax structure prior to indexation, and
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See Field, Some Reflections on the Reagan Tax Bill, 13 TAX NOTES 317 (Aug. 3, 1981)
("In the past — most tax bills moved through Congress on a two-year schedule. This has permit-
ted time for hearings on substantially all the major changes proposed in the bills." Id. at 318).
6 13 TAX NOTES 237 (July 27, 1981) (The Senate approved the indexing amendment
57-40, and the Administration agreed to would "reluctantly" accept it as part of the Act.)
See, e.g., Budget Message to the Congress, President Ronald Reagan (February 8,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Reagan Budget Message] ("Bracket creep will never again
systematically plunder the rewards for production and effort."). But see McKenzie, An Introduction
to the Personal Tax 'Cuts', Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1982 at 22, col. 3; Field, supra note 5, at 320.
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the extent of indexing to begin in 1985 will not fully compensate for the effects
of inflation upon the income tax. Effective federal tax rates upon the same
amount of income measured in "constant" dollars& are likely, absent an
amendment to ERTA increasing the rate reductions, to continue rising as a
consequence of inflation, both before and after indexing takes effect in 1985.
Nevertheless, during budget debates members of Congress from both parties
have called for rolling back ERTA's rate reductions.9
Under an income tax system based on progressive tax rates, any increase
in income increases a taxpayer's effective tax rate. Inflation reduces the real
value of tax bracket steps by pushing an individual whose ineome in constant
dollars remains unaltered into higher brackets." It also erodes the value of
fixed nominal amounts present in the tax structure, such as exemptions,
allowances and deductions." An increase in adjusted gross income can repre-
sent either a real increase in constant dollars or a fictitious increase in nominal
dollars caused by inflation.'2 Therefore, under a progressive rate schedule, a
taxpayer's effective tax rate can rise while his income in constant dollars re-
mains the same, or even decreases, unless the tax structure is adjusted to ac-
count for inflation." This result is the "bracket creep" at which indexing is
directed." In the United States, an increase in adjusted gross income of 1 per-
cent increases federal tax liability by approximately 1.5 percent." Because of
this phenomenon, inflation effectively provides the government with an auto-
° "Constant" dollars are dollars that have been deflated back to a base period to offset
the effects of inflation on their nominal amounts that has occurred in the interim period. Such a
fictitious increase could also be caused by currency devaluation.
9 See, e. g., Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, Sen. Robert Dole, suggested abandoning the final 10 percent reduction in individual
income tax reduction and beginning indexing in 1983 as a measure to increase revenue and
decrease projected budget deficits). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1982, at 35, col. 1 (Sen. Hol-
lings proposed elimination of the 1982 tax cut of 10 percent and reduction of the 1983 tax cut of
10 percent to a cut of only 5 percent to reduce the projected budget deficits); N.Y. Times, Feb.
11, 1982, at 30, col. 1 (Sens. Gorton and Rudman consider a "reverse trigger" to eliminate the
tax cuts in the face of adverse economic conditions).
See, Surdey, Indexing the Income Tax for Inflation, 32 NAT'L. TAX. J. 328 (1979);
Thomas & Zimmerman, Tax Division Backs Indexing, THE TAX ADVISOR 428 (July 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Thomas]; Ruppe, General Report, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 89, 95 (1977)
(WA Conference Vienna).
" See, Sunley, supra note 10 at 328; Thomas, supra note 9, at 428; Ruppe, supra note 10,
at 95.
12 See Sunley, supra note 10, at 328-29.
" See id. This increase in the effective tax rate due to inflation could not occur under a
flat, or proportional, tax rate since this type of tax system would preserve the same ratio of total
tax to total income. Kelley, Hall, Aronsohn, & Hickman, Indexing for Inflation, 31 TAX LAW. 17,
18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kelley]. Even under this proportional tax system, however, the
minimal amount subject to taxation would have to be adjusted to account for inflation in order to
eliminate its effects on the tax structure, unless all amounts, no matter how small, were subject to
the tax.
" See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
" Furstenberg, Individual Income Taxation and Inflation, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 117, 119
(1975). See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, INDEXING THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
FOR INFLATION, 11 n.8 (Government Printing Office 1980) [hereinafter cited as CB0 STUDY]
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matic tax increase, without any legislative consent.' 6 Government coffers
benefit, while the taxpayer loses.
In deciding whether to adjust a tax system for inflation, several factors
should be recognized and addressed. The initial factors include purely political .
considerations such as the desirability, ramifications, and goals of adjusting
taxes. Beyond these considerations, relevant factors include the political and
technical considerations concerning the components of the tax system to be ad-
justed and the appropriate type of adjustment to be undertaken. A decision to
offset inflation's impact on a particular component of the tax system will affect
all other inter-related components of the system. Thus, the impact of the deci-
sion to adjust one component cannot be fully understood without examining
the inter-relation among components and analyzing the overall effect of the ad-
justment on the tax system.
In any tax system, the decision whether to adjust for inflation is primarily
a political decision. Although not attempting to draw normative conclusions
concerning the political considerations or goals of indexing, this article will
identify factors that are relevant to any decision to inflation-adjust taxes and
examine the ramifications of choosing particular methods to implement this
decision. If decision-makers do not consider all of these factors in choosing
whether to inflation-adjust taxes, as well as the impact of an adjustment on
other components of the tax system, then the adjustments undertaken will not
correctly compensate for the effect of inflation upon the overall tax system. In
making the inflation adjustments contained in ERTA, Congress did not ad-
dress many of the factors. which affect any attempt to adjust a tax system to off-
set the impact of inflation. Hence, the adjustments contained in ERTA are
defective in their attempt to compensate for the effect of inflation on our tax
system.
The purpose of this article is to examine indexing and other inflation ad-
justments provided by ERTA. Section I includes an examination of factors
relevant to any decision to adjust a tax system for inflation, including both
practical choices and theoretical considerations. The section then addresses the
options in designing an automatic indexing system, should the decision be
made to adjust part or all of the tax system through indexation. In Section II,
the article examines state tax indexing in effect prior to the enactment of
(estimates ranging from 1.3% to 1.9%); Sunley, supra note 10, at 328 (elasticity of income tax
with respect to inflation is about 1.5); Thomas, supra note 10, at 428.
16 See Thomas, supra note 10, at 428; Note, Inflation and the Federal Income Tax, 82 YALE
L.J. 716, 740 (1973); Kelley, supra note 13, at 18; Vukelich, The Effect of Inflation on Real Tax
Rates, 20 CAN. TAX J. 327 (1972). After examining inflation's impact on individual income taxes
in Canada before indexing adjustments to the tax system were reenacted, Vukelich concluded:
Thus, inflation may be viewed as a form of taxation which to the government has
all the psychological benefits of being indirect. Without the necessity of winning
parliamentary approval and without overtly raising nominal tax rates, the govern-
ment can obtain a rising share of personal incomes so long as it maintains a steady
rate of inflation.
Vukelich, id. at 342.
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ERTA. Section III details discretionary adjustments to the United States tax
system and their relation to inflation during the 1960's and 1970's in an at-
tempt to provide a perspective from which to view the adjustments for inflation
made in ERTA. This historical background includes adjustments to both the
federal income tax and the social security tax. Section IV includes a description
of indexing and other inflation adjustments as provided by ERTA. In Section
V, the article critiques the effectiveness of ERTA's rate-cutting provisions
prior to 1985 and its automatic indexing provisions for subsequent years as ad-
justments to offset inflation. This analysis reaches the conclusion that ERTA's
overall provisions are insufficient to fully offset the effects of inflation on the in-
dividual taxpayer, and that the indexing measures adopted are poorly drafted
and will result in effects not explicitly intended by advocates of indexation.
Finally, Section VI contains proposals to amend ERTA that would improve
the effectiveness of indexing in offsetting the impact of inflation upon
America's taxpayers.
I. ADJUSTING FOR INFLATION: FACTORS TO CONSIDER
Any adjustments to a tax system to compensate for the effect of inflation
will affect various factors within the system. Hence, prior to enactment of any
such adjustments, choices regarding these factors should be addressed by the
appropriate decision-making body. At the outset, the first choice is whether to
make any adjustments whatsoever to the tax system to offset the effects of infla-
tion on tax liabilities. If the decision is to adjust, other preliminary choices exist
including whether to adjust the entire tax system to offset inflation and whether
to undertake adjustments that are ad hoc and discretionary or scientific and
automatic. If any part of the tax system is to be automatically adjusted, a
secondary set of choices regarding specific factors in the design of an indexing
system should be addressed. Such choices exist among the numerous options
available to implement indexing, including which index to use and whether to
adjust taxes for the entire change in the index. In addition, one must decide
how often to index, and how much of a time lag to allow between index changes
and tax adjustments. It is important to note that once an indexing provision is
enacted at least an implicit decision is made to adopt certain options over
others that might have been available. In effect, one cannot ignore an option by
simply not including it in the adopted indexing provision. Thus, all choices
must be considered in adopting any indexing provision.
A. Preliminary Factors—Inflation's Impact on Taxes
1. Whether to Adjust Taxes for Inflation
The initial choice is whether adjustments to the tax system to offset the im-
pact of inflation are desired. Various factors must be examined before deciding
to adjust a tax system on account of inflation. These factors involve political
and psychological attitudes toward the tax system as much as, if not more than,
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economic considerations. There are at least five crucial considerations to be ad-
dressed, some economic, some political and psychological, when determining
whether taxation should be adjusted to account for inflation."
The first consideration is the rate of inflation. As the level of inflation
rises, its effect on taxation increases. Federal tax liabilities increase 1.5 times as
fast as inflation." That is, each 1 percent rise in inflation increases tax liability
by a corresponding 1.5 percent." If one goal of the tax system is to maintain
tax liability as a fairly constant percentage of a given level of real income, ab-
sent a legislatively enacted tax increase, this effect of inflation must be offset.
Therefore, where inflation is high, and is expected to remain high in the future,
a strong argument can be made in favor of providing adjustments. 2° If the
public accepts inflation as a fact of life and adjusts its expectations to account
for inflation, perhaps the tax system also should be adjusted. At low levels of
inflation, decision makers may not view the incremental increase in tax
liabilities as necessitating adjustments to the tax system. At high levels of infla-
tion, however, adjustments become necessary if the semblance of a constant
level of taxation is to be maintained over time.
A second consideration is that in times of inflation, adjustments are
necessary to maintain the current distribution of the tax burden among tax-
payers at various income levels. If maintenance of the current distribution is
one goal of the tax system, only such adjustments will allow the tax burden
distribution to remain as the legislature intended in its earlier, or original, tax-
rate-making decisions. 2 ' Without adjustments inflation changes the distribu-
tion of the tax burden among taxpayers in different income groups. 22 For ex-
ample, on one hand, although larger percentages of cost-of-living increases will
be taxed away from middle and upper-middle income persons than from low-
income persons," the personal exemption will shield lesser amounts of con-
stant dollars, thus hurting low-income persons more than middle and upper
level wage earners." On the other hand, persons with very high income are
least affected because exemptions do not shield much of their income and they
already have most of their income taxed at the highest marginal rate, so they
cannot be pushed into a higher bracket by inflation. The effect of inflation
upon income from sources such as capital gain, municipal bond interest, and
Social Security benefits also alters the distribution of the federal tax burden
among different groups. 25 Since these sources are not evenly distributed among
" Ruppe, supra note 10, at 96-98.
'a See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
12 Id.
20 Ruppe, supra note 10, at 96.
2 ' Id.
22 CBO STUDY, supra note 15 at 5. See Vukelich, supra note 16, at 342. ("Surely infla-
tion is a clumsy way of raising taxes, with surprising and unintended effects on burden distribu-
tion.").
23 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 5.
24 Id. at 7.
25 Id. at 5-7.
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taxpayers in the various groups, and inflation may affect some of these sources
more than others, inflation will alter the distribution of the tax burden. 2 ° Thus,
without adjustment, inflation will automatically change the original "burden
structure," increasing and shifting the burden without specific legislative
directions. The extent to which one considers this uncontrolled burden alloca-
tion desirable will dictate, in part, whether one considers indexing desirable.
A third consideration is macro-economic stabilization. Under classic
Keynesian economic principles, inflation's impact on taxes is viewed as a
stabilizer." Because the elasticity of tax revenue is greater than one,n without
adjustments to the tax system, inflation will cause concealed progression up the
tax rate structure. 29 Traditionally, this consideration weighed against inflation
adjustments because unadjusted taxes would rise more than proportionately in
time of inflation leaving less money in the hands of the public, thus lowering
aggregate demand. Therefore, concealed progression in times of inflation was
seen as contributing to economic stabilization. 3° Indeed, where inflation is in-
duced by excess demand, "demand-pull" inflation, the theory is that the
unadjusted tax system will reduce inflation by lowering demand and thus
stabilizing prices. 3 ' Two simulation-studies — one of the Canadian and
another of the American tax systems — however, have found that the failure to
adjust a tax system for inflation provides little or no economic stabilization dur-
ing inflationary periods. 32 In the Canadian simulation the main reason was
that "the inflation-caused tax increases tended to lag behind the beginning of a
demand-induced surge in inflation." 33 In the American simulation "the
reason was that the magnitudes of the changes were very small relative to the
overall demand consequences of these shocks. "34 Even if concealed progression
does provide some stabilization, at high rates of inflation it becomes ques-
tionable whether the greatly increased progression is desirable. Further, if in-
flation is induced by unexpected cost increases, "cost-push" inflation, classic
Keynesian theory is not applicable.P A tax system that is not adjusted to offset
26 Id.
27 See M. L. HATTEN, MACRO-ECONOMICS FOR MANAGEMENT 215-16 (1981).
28 Elasticity is a term used in economics to depict the change in one item when a second
item increases or decreases. A positive elasticity indicates that an increase in the second item
results in an increase in the first item. A negative elasticity indicates that an increase in the sec-
ond item results in a decrease in the first item. The elasticity of the income tax liability with
respect to inflation is about + 1.5, meaning that taxes rise by about 1.5% with every I% of infla-
tion, that is taxes rise one and one-half times the rate of inflation. Sunley, supra note 10, at 328.
See supra text accompanying notes 15, 18, 19.
2.9 See infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
3° Ruppe, supra note 10, at 96-97. See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX 25 (H. Aaron
ed. 1976). Macroeconomics textbooks refer to the unadjusted progressive income taxes as an
automatic stabilizer. See, e.g., HATTEN, supra note 27, at 215-16.
31 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 20.
32 Bossons & Wilson, Adjusting Tax Rates for Inflation, 21 CAN. TAX J. 185, 190-93
(1973); INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 173-88.
33 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 20.
34 Id. at 21.
33 HATTEN, supra note 27, at 226.
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concealed progression caused by "cost-push" inflation produces further
destabilization by not allowing after-tax income to "catch-up" with the higher
prices. 36 Cost-push inflation is likely to be accompanied by a rise in unemploy-
ment, and such unemployment is likely to be aggravated by any drop in de-
mand caused by an unadjusted tax system." Thus both income and employ-
ment are destabilized by an unadjusted tax system. This contribution to
destabilization could be substantially mitigated by automatically adjusting the
tax system. 38 Moreover, secondary effects of concealed progression can include
increased wage demands and higher pricing to offset both inflation and this
added concealed progression, thus fueling additional inflation." According to
one view, once the system is indexed, concealed progression will not occur, and
the public will no longer need to take it into consideration when negotiating
wages or setting prices." Thus, the elimination of this secondary effect of con-
cealed progression would reduce inflationary pressures. In the 1970's, several
countries including Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands enacted indexed
inflation adjustments based, at least in part, on this premise in the hope that
they would aid in stabilizing prices. 4 '
The role and scope of the public sector is yet another consideration in-
fluencing whether inflation adjustments should be made. Concealed progres-
sion through inflation leads to increased wealth transfer from the private sector
to the public sector. 42 The more-than-proportionate growth in tax revenues
due to inflation allows the government to increase spending without actually
enacting higher tax rates or increasing deficit-spending. 43 If the tax system is
adjusted for inflation, however, this hidden growth in government revenues
will cease. Hence, corresponding reductions in the rate of increase in govern-
ment spending must follow to avoid larger deficits.** On the one hand, those in
favor of expanding the public sector often may be opposed to inflation ad-
justments, even if publicly they deplore the added tax burden on the poor and
needy due to inflation, because of the pressure such adjustments would exert to
reduce growth in government spending. 43 On the other hand, those favoring
36 CBO STUDY supra note 15, at 21; See Bossons & Wilson, supra note 32, at 196-97,
199.
" HATEEN, Supra note 27, at 228.
" Bosson & Wilson, supra note 32, at 199.
39 Allan, Dodge & Poddar, Indexing the Personal Income Tax: A Federal Perspective, 22 CAN.
TAX J. 355, 368-69 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Allan] (Allan refers to this secondary effect as
"tax-push inflation."). Whether wage increases lead to increased inflation may depend in part
on how the monetary authority, the Federal Reserve Board alters the size of the supply of money
in response to the increased demand for money.
4° Ruppe, supra note 10, at 97. See Allan, supra note 39, at 369 (indexing should weaken
this source of inflation).
4 ' Ruppe, supra note 10, at 97.
42 Id. at 97-98.
4 ' CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 15.
" See, e.g., Probyn, What Indexing Income Taxes Produced for Canada, N.Y. Times, Aug.
23, 1981, at F6; Gaffney, A Time to Stop Bracket Creep, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1981, at F2.
43 See V. TANZI, INFLATION AND THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX 143 (1980).
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reduced government spending and the requirement of specific legislative
authorization for expanding the role of government, usually favor some form of
inflation adjustments to the tax system."
One final consideration is the psychological impact of adjusting the tax
system to take account of inflation. Many people contend that such action in ef-
fect signals the admission that past economic and fiscal policy has been defi-
cient, unable to reverse the inflationary trend.47 This, in turn, is believed to be
an indication that the outlook for the future is for continued inflation and that
there is a lessened resolve on behalf of government to combat it." Proponents
of indexation of the tax system, however, contend that such automatic ad-
justments will make it easier for governments to pursue anti-inflationary
policy." Presumably, this view is based on several premises. Anti-inflationary
policies are pursued at the risk of incurring the high costs, both human and
monetary, associated with unemployment.50 Thus, strong pressures often are
exerted against such policies or in favor of slowing the implementation of such
policies." The rationale holds that these pressures become so great the govern-
ment will no longer be able to pursue effective anti-inflationary policies if it is
free to continue to reap more-than-proportionate increases in tax revenues due
to inflation." These increased revenues through governmental inaction in
making discretionary adjustments could be used to fight unemployment."
Thus, if inflation-adjustments are left to discretion, the government could be
pressured to reverse direction and stop pursuing anti-inflationary policy much
more easily than if adjustments are automatically made."
Taken together, the above considerations indicate that a preliminary
choice to inflation adjust the tax system is likely to be based on prevailing
political beliefs and expectations rather than an exhaustive economic
analysis." The question of whether to adopt inflation adjustments is primarily
a function of the political consideration of tax policy goals, public sector growth
and the role of the legislature in increasing taxes.56 On the one hand, reasons to
support inflation-adjustment to taxes include: high expected inflation; the
desire to maintain a constant percentage tax liability on constant real income;
the desire to maintain the current "tax-burden" structure; the desire to con-
strain the growth and spending ability of the public sector; and the belief that
46 See it See also Allan, supra note 39, at 369 (A process of explicitly legislated tax in-
creases is superior from the point of view of accountability to taxpayers than is the alternative of
relying upon a hidden "inflation tax.").
" Ruppe, supra note 10, at 98.
55 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 26.
45 TANZI, supra note 45, at 144.
5° It
" See it
52 Id.
53 See id.
54 See
35 See INFLATION AND THE INCOME Tx, supra note 30, at 27.
56 Ruppe, supra note 10, at 99.
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inflation-adjustment of taxes will reduce inflationary pressure on wages. On
the other hand, reasons for opposition to inflation-adjustment include: low ex-
pected inflation; the desire to shift the current "tax burden" structure; the
desire to expand the public sector; the belief that inflation-induced concealed
progression contributes to economic stabilization; and the belief that ad-
justments indicate a lessened resolve on behalf of government to combat infla-
tion. These expectations and political goals effect the initial determination of
whether to make inflation adjustments. The remainder of this article is prem-
ised on the assumption that a decision has been made to adjust the tax system
to offset inflation.
2. Types of Adjustment: Structure vs. Base
Two major types of inflation adjustment can be undertaken: adjustment
of the tax structure and adjustment of the tax base." In this context, the tax
structure includes tax rates, brackets, deductions, exemptions, and all other
nominal fixed-dollar amounts in the tax system." Adjustments to the tax struc-
ture would effect only these components, they would not effect the components
of the tax base. The tax base includes components in the system necessary for
the measurement of taxable income derived from assets, such as depreciation
and basis. Adjusting the tax base is more complex than adjusting the tax struc-
ture, and would have a more fundamental effect upon the tax system." These
two types of adjustments could be undertaken either together or independent-
ly. so
The first major type of inflation adjustment, tax structure adjustment, is
more familiar and has been undertaken in some form by over twenty
countries. 6 ' Tax structure adjustments are made in response to the concealed
" A third type of inflation adjustment, much less widely addressed than the two noted
in the text, is adjustment to taxpayer liabilities and refunds. TANZI, supra note 45, at 7. These ad-
justments relate to the effect on revenue of lags in tax collection under inflation, since taxes paid
later can be paid in money with a lower real or "constant" value. TANZI, supra, note 45, at 7,
74-84. Ruppe, supra note 10, at 95-96, 99. Such adjustments, however, are available in the
presence, or absence, of either of the two types of adjustments noted in the text and, in com-
parison to them, represent more of a fine tuning of the desired system than a major adjustment to
the system. See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 1-2.
58 Kelley, supra note 13, at 20 (classified as Phase I adjustments); CBO STUDY, supra
note 15, at 1-2 & n.1 (classified as Type I adjustments). In addressing adjustments to the tax
structure, one commentator distinguished between adjustments to exemptions and adjustments
to brackets. TANZI, supra note 45, at 6.
59 Kelley, supra note 13, at 21 (classified as Phase II adjustments); See CBO STUDY,
supra note 15, at 2 & n.4 (classified as Type II adjustments).
6° Foreign experience provides examples of structural adjustments being undertaken
independently. Ruppe, supra note 10, at 99.
61 By 1981, the following countries had undertaken various adjustments to their in-
dividual income tax structure which offset inflation: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Israel, and
Uruguay (full, automatic, and annual adjustments based on a price index); Belgium, Brazil,
Finland, France, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom (regular adjustments entailing either partial indexing or considerable discretion as to
the scope of the adjustment); Chile, Denmark, Iceland, Peru (regular adjustments based on an
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progression caused by the impact of inflation upon the progressive tax rate."
Such adjustments would be unnecessary if the income tax rate were strictly
proportional and were levied on gross income without exemptions." By reduc-
ing the real value of fixed-dollar amounts, including the Zero Bracket Amount
and the tax brackets, inflation increases the progressivity of an already pro-
gressive rate structure because the taxpayer becomes subject to higher effective
and marginal rates at a lower constant-dollar income." This concealed pro-
gression due to inflation results in the phenomenon of "effective-rate creep"
where a taxpayer's effective tax rate increases although income in constant
dollars remains the same." This can push a taxpayer into a higher tax bracket,
although his income in constant dollars remains the same, resulting in the
widely acclaimed "bracket-creep. ,,66
The second major type of inflation adjustment, tax base adjustments, are
less familiar and have been undertaken to a limited extent in only a few coun-
tries." As assets increase in value over time, part of the increase represents a
rise in real value measured in constant dollars, while the remainder of the in-
crease merely compensates owners for increases in the general price level due
to inflation." Inflation-adjustments to the tax base would include increasing
the basis of assets by the amount of inflation before calculating taxable gain or
loss, thereby basing taxes on real gain or loss in constant dollars." Com-
index other than a price index). Other nations including Austria, Greece, Mexico, Spain, United
States, and West Germany have occasionally undertaken discretionary adjustments which were
not expressly intended to counter inflation. Ruppe, supra note 10, at 113-14; TANZI, supra note
45, at 150; CBO Study, supra note 15, at 2.
63 See TANZI, supra note 45, at 6.
63 Id. & n.15.
65
 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. This is true for all tax brackets below
the top bracket. If a substantial portion of all taxpayers reach the top bracket, progressivity would
be reduced.
65 See Slinky, supra note 10, at 328. For example, assume the first $10,000 is taxed at a
rate of 10%, the second $10,000 at 20%, and the third $10,000 at 30%. If the taxpayer makes
$19,000 in year 1, his tax would be $2800, representing an effective tax rate of 14.7%. After in-
flation of 10% in year 2, the taxpayer's income would remain the same in constant dollars if he
made $20,900. With an income of $20,900, however, the taxpayer's marginal rate will increase
to 30%. His tax liability will increase to $3,270, representing an effective tax rate of 15.6%.
While the before tax income remained the same in constant dollars, the real value of after-tax in-
come has decreased due to the impact of inflation.
66 Under a progressive rate structure, effective-rate creep will occur regardless of
whether the taxpayer is pushed into a higher tax bracket; a larger amount of his income will be
taxed at his marginal rate. For example, using the rates of taxation and inflation in note 65 supra,
if income is $18,000 in year 1, tax liability is $2,600, representing an effective tax rate of 14.4%.
If income remains the same in constant dollars in year 2 it will be $19,800 and tax liability will be
$2,960, representing an effective tax rate of 14.9%. Thus, it is misleading to label the
phenomenon "bracket creep"; "effective rate creep" is a more accurate description.
67 Israel has indexed the basis of capital assets for capital gain taxation purposes since
1975. Rafael, Tax Reform in Israel, 11 Is. L. REV. 187, 202-07 (1976). By 1981, Sweden and
Argentina had undertaken tax base adjustments in the measurement of gains from the sale of cer-
tain real property. CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 2-3.
66 CBO Study, supra note 15 at 2.
69 See id. at 2-3.
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prehensive tax base adjustment would take into account the effects of inflation
by adjusting measurement of business depreciation and inventories, as well as
by reducing interest income and interest deductions." These tax base ad-
justments are more complex and involve more difficult problems than tax
structure adjustments." The aim here should be to protect equity to the extent
it is invested in erosible or non-protected assets. 72 Tax base adjustments are
made in response to inflation per se." They would be required to adjust any tax
system for the effect of inflation regardless of the progressivity or proportionali-
ty of taxes in that system, so long as inflation existed. 74
To offset the full impact of inflation on the tax system, both types of ad-
justment must be undertaken. The use of either type of adjustment in-
dependently will produce a result short of a complete inflation-offset, and some
commentators have questioned the desirability of rate structure adjustments at
any rate of inflation. 75 The application of either structure or base adjustments
or both to various categories of income will produce different effects on the tax
system. Particular categories of income may be fully "cleansed" of inflation's
impact through different combinations of the two types of adjustments.
3. Whether to Adjust the Entire Tax System for Inflation
Once a decision has been made to make inflation adjustments to the tax
system, attention must next focus on what components of the system to adjust.
An examination of the various types of adjustments which could be made
demonstrates that the decision to make any one adjustment will affect tax
liabilities in other categories. In addition to the broad categories of individual
and business income taxes, specific categories of income such as capital gain
and interest income have been singled out for special tax policy treatment
under current American law. These categories, along with all others, have
been affected greatly by inflation. Thus, all of these tax categories are potential
candidates for inflation adjustments. Most importantly, all of these categories
are interrelated. An inflation adjustment to some of these categories, or to part
of a category, will impact other categories, or other parts of the same category.
If this interrelationship is not recognized, a decision to inflation-adjust any por-
tion of the tax system may have unanticipated, or unwanted, effects on other
portions of the system. Thus, the relative equities of the present tax systems as
defined by Congress in the Internal Revenue Code may be altered by any deci-
sion to make adjustments for inflation. This unintended alteration of equities
should be taken into account in making any decision concerning whether to
70 Id. at 3.
" TANZI, supra note 45, at 7; Kelly, supra note 13, at 21; See Report of the Committee of In-
quiry into Taxation Under Inflation 10 (Ministry of Finance, Israel 1980) [hereinafter cited as Taxa-
tion Under Inflation].
72 See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
73 See TANZI, supra note 45, at 7.
74 Id. at 7.
75 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 27.
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make the adjustments throughout the tax system or only in parts of the system.
Tax treatment of individual income is distorted by inflation's impact on
the tax structure as well as on the tax base. Inflation's impact on the individual
tax structure results in, as noted, effective-rate creep, exacerbating the pro-
gressive nature of the tax rates.76 All individual income, regardless of source, is
subject to this phenomenon because of inflation. Individual income derived
from the sale of assets," or from interest," is also distorted by inflation's im-
pact not only on the tax structure but also on the tax base. Individuals are
taxed on the entire nominal income from assets, not just on their real gain."
Many individuals, however, receive all, or a large part, of their income as
earned income, derived from wages or salaries, and not from non-labor assets.
To the extent that an individual's income represents earned income, inflation
adjustments to the tax structure could offset the impact of inflation on his taxes.
Therefore, inflation adjustments to the tax structure would alleviate the impact
of inflation on individual income taxes to a greater extent than a similar adjust-
ment to other categories of income derived more heavily from assets. Tax
structure adjustments would go a long way toward eliminating the inequities
caused solely by progressivity's interaction with inflation, or effective-rate
creep.'" Inequities caused by inflation's distortion of the tax base, however,
would remain if base adjustments do not accompany the structure ad-
justments." On the one hand, inflation adjustments made to the tax structure
would redistribute tax liabilities in favor of taxpayers who receive higher pro-
portions of their income as earned income. On the other hand, inflation ad-
justments made to the tax base would redistribute tax liabilities in favor of tax-
payers who receive higher proportions of investment income.
In contrast to most individual income, both structural and base ad-
justments are necessary to achieve any significant lessening of inflation's im-
pact on business income. The category of business income is composed of in-
come from unincorporated proprietorships, partnerships and corporations,
while the first two types of income are taxed at individual rates, corporate tax
rates reach their highest marginal rate at $100,000.82 For most practical pur-
poses, therefore, the corporate tax is a flat proportional tax, not a progressive
tax. Although nominal amounts, including bracket amounts, are eroded by in-
flation, concealed progression is a relatively minor part of inflation's effect on
business income. Thus, structural adjustments alone are insufficient to offset
inflation's impact on business income. Adjustments to the tax base are re-
" See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. For additional discussion of inflation's
impact on individual income see K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 301-03, 305-09 (1982)
(received after preparation of this manuscript).
" See I.R.C. §561(a)(3), 64, 1001(a) (1982).
" Id. at $61(a)(4).
" Id. at 541001(a), 10I1(a).
8° See TANZI, supra note 45, at 148.
81 Id,
82 I.R.C. S 11(b) (1982).
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quired to achieve any substantial offset of inflation's effect on business income.
Inflation distorts both the balance sheet and the income statement because of
their reliance on historical cost data to determine both depreciation deductions
and income generated by inventory sales." When depreciation is based on
historical costs, and is deducted over a period determined to be an asset's
useful life, business income is greatly overstated in an era of high inflation.
During periods of high inflation, these depreciation deductions will not reflect
the relevant cost of replacement, and business will be taxed on income required
for replacement of worn-out assets." In addition, calculating taxable gain on
the sale of inventory items where basis of those items is tied to historical cost,
whether determined according to FIFO or LIFO, produces a similar distortion
in taxable income due to inflation. 85 If a goal of inflation adjusting the taxation
of business income is to base taxes on real gain or real loss in constant dollars,
assets and liabilities both require inflation adjustments to be corrected to reflect
a real tax base instead of a nominal base. To the extent that nominal gains in
business income calculations are based on historical depreciation and inventory
costs, a tax on these nominal gains is really a tax on capital. Similarly, to the
extent that deductions for payments on debt are calculated on a nominal basis,
real gains may be reflected as losses." Adjustments to the tax base would be re-
quired to eliminate these effects of inflation.
The accounting profession recently recognized the need to consider infla-
tion's impact on business income in order to obtain genuine measurements of it
by requiring large corporations to supplement traditional financial statements
with inflation-adjusted information. -In the United States, the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board Statement 33 (FASB 33) provides guidelines for
93 TANZ1, supra note 45, at 63. See Sunley, supra note 10, at 330. For additional discus-
sion of inflation's impact on business income see ROSENN, supra note 76, at 296-300, 309d 0
84 Thomas, supra, note 10, at 428. One study of 2977 corporate income tax returns in
the United States concluded that due to inflation depreciation allowed on existing plant and
equipment was understated by $39.7 billion. Id. Inflation-induced fictitious profits due to this
depreciation understatement alone resulted in tax payments of $19 billion, representing almost
one-third of the total corporate tax liability of $59 billion in 1977. Id.
85 The first-in, first-out (FIFO) method of accounting assumes that the oldest goods are
sold first. See ANTHONY & REECE, ACCOUNTING TEXT AND CASES 184, 188. The last-in, first-
out (LIFO) method of accounting bases the cost of goods sold figure on the most recent purchases
of inventory items. Id. at 184, 187-88. In periods of inflation, LIFO results in higher cost of goods
sold than FIFO, and therefore a lower measurement of taxable income. Id. Under inflation, pro-
ponents of LIFO argue that it makes little sense to state income at the current dollar value while
stating expenses in terms of an older, more valuable dollar. Id. The use of LIFO rather than
FIFO may result in a more meaningful income statement, but a less realistic balance sheet. Id.
Although the use of LIFO results in the expense of cost of goods sold being valued in terms of the
most recent purchases, inflation may distort this figure just as it does figures under FIFO where
either a long period of time or a period of high inflation exists between the last purchase and the
sale. In a period of inflation, FIFO results in a cost of goods sold figure well below the current
price of inputs in the production process. Id. This difference increases the measurement of tax-
able income, because of the fictitious gain on the sale due to inflation. Id.
88 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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business by which to present inflation adjusted financial data. 87 FASB 33 re-
quires businesses to calculate and report several categories of adjusted data, in-
cluding: income adjusted for general inflation; purchasing power gain or loss;
gain or loss on net monetary assets; and income, inventory, and property on a
current cost basis. 88 To present this information, a business must measure the
effects of changing prices on inventory, property, plant equipment, cost of
goods sold, and depreciation expenses." Furthermore, many large corpora-
tions required by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to provide
inflation-adjusted information use this data internally to help them assess their
financial status and set their future course." As inflation adjustments achieve
more universal acceptance by businesses and are reflected in their internal
financial planning, the divergence between a business' financial statements
and its income tax returns increases. If tax accounting, and ultimately tax
liability, remain based on historical costs while financial accounting continues
moving towards current costs in order to obtain a more accurate measurement
of a business' income, the result will be taxation upon what would be viewed as
fictitious income by accountants and businessmen. If a goal of the tax system is
to tax businesses based on a numerical indication of financial gain or loss, and
both businesses and investors view these adjusted figures as a more accurate
picture of real economic performance, the argument is strengthened that tax
accounting and liability also should be inflation adjusted.
Adjustments to the tax base are necessary to offset inflation's impact on
business assets and liabilities. Inflation, however, effects different types of
assets and liabilities in different ways. This fact must be taken into account in
deciding what, if any adjustments should be undertaken. Assets can be divided
into two categories to distinguish inflation's differing impact upon them: eros-
ible and non-erosible assets. Erosible assets generally depreciate in value dur-
ing periods of inflation and are realized or used up in the relatively short-run."
Examples of erosible assets include: machinery, equipment, and other
depreciable assets with a useful life less than ten years; inventories; cash; ac-
counts receivable; tax-deductible prepaid expenses; and registered securities."
Since inflation erodes the value of these assets, a tax base inflation-adjustment
is necessary to protect their real value in periods of high inflation." Non-
erosible assets generally do not depreciate in value during periods of inflation
87 SUMMARY STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 33 1 FINAN-
CIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter cited as FASB 33]. See INFLA-
TION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 81-114 (chapter 3: `Inflation Accounting: Implementa-
tion of the FASB Proposal n).
88 FASB 33, supra note 87, at 1.
99 Id. at 2.
9° Casey & Sandretto, Internal Uses of Accounting for Inflation, 59 HARV. Bus. REV. 149,
149 (Nov. 1981).
91 See Taxation Under Inflation, supra note 71, at 10, 12.
92 Id. at 24.
g' See id. at 15.
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and their value is usually realized in the long run." Examples of non-erosible
assets include immovables other than depreciable immovables with a useful life
less than ten years and leasehold rights for more than ten years.° Beyond ad-
justing annual depreciation, 96 inflation adjustments need not be made regard-
ing such assets."
A goal of many proponents of inflation-adjusting the business income
category of the tax system is to protect erosible assets financed by owner's equi-
ty. 98 One method to achieve this goal would be to inflation-adjust the tax base
by allowing a deduction equal to either erosible assets minus debt, or equity
minus non-erosible assets. 99
Short of a comprehensive inflation adjustment, to the tax base for all eros-
ible assets financed by equity, particular types of assets or liabilities could be
protected from inflation. Such partial adjustments, however, would produce
different results for different taxpayers. Adjusting the tax base of any single
asset, or group of assets, would result in different treatment for businesses that
hold large amounts of the protected assets as compared to those that hold large
amounts of unprotected assets. For example, if cash were given protection,
banks would be insulated from a large part of inflation's impact, while a
business holding a large inventory of goods and little cash would not be much
better off in terms of inflation's impact upon them than before such an adjust-
ment. Adjusting the tax base of liabilities would also result in different treat-
ment according to the amount of the particular liabilities held. For example, if
debt instruments such as notes, bonds and debentures were protected, inflation
adjustments for both creditors and debtors would benefit the former and hurt
the latter — just the opposite of inflation's current impact. 10° Firms with higher
amounts of debt capital would suffer compared to firms with lower amounts of
debt capital. If such disparities are to be avoided, all assets and liabilities must
be treated similarly under a comprehensive inflation adjustment.
94 See id. at 25.
95 Id .
96 See id. at 14.
" See id. at 25 (so long as the increase in value is not taxed until realization, at which
point the real component of capital gain should be taxed at ordinary rates and the inflationary
gain should be exempt). See also infra note 121.
98 See Taxation Under Inflation, supra note 71, at 8-9. See generally H.J. HOFSTRA, AN
INFLATION-ADJUSTED TAX SYSTEM (Government Publishing Office, The Hague, 1978). For
example, if erosible assets such as inventory are purchased using capital, rather than loan pro-
ceeds, upon the sale of the assets, tax will be levied on nominal gain, although inventory value
has not kept pace with inflation. If, however, capital has been used to purchase a non-erosible
asset such as land, whose value raises and maintains pace with inflation, no tax will be levied un-
til realization upon which time value will have increased commensurate with inflation.
99 See id. at 9 (proposed in Israel as part of a comprehensive "capital preservation
scheme"); Bossons, Implementing Capital Gains Tax Reform, 27 CAN. TAX J. 145, 150-52 (1979)
(proposal that allows cost base indexation to be applied only to the fraction of assets which are not
financed by debt).
'°° See infra text accompanying notes 101-12.
1272 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:1257
In deciding what categories of income to adjust for inflation, attention
should be paid to two specific components of the broad categories of individual
and business income which are particularly prone to distortion due to inflation:
interest and capital gains income. The interrelationships between these com-
ponents and the broader categories of individual and business income must be
recognized in order to evaluate what sort of inflation adjustments are desired.
Both individual and business income include income derived from interest and
the sale of capital assets. Any inflation adjustments made to either interest or
capital gains would affect the broader categories of income, regardless of
whether any adjustments were made to either broad category as a whole. Fur-
thermore, to offset inflation's entire impact on either individual or business in-
come, tax base inflation adjustments must be made to interest and capital gains
income.
The tax system's treatment of interest income is distorted greatly by infla-
tion."' Since interest income is taxed the same as other business or individual
income,102 inflation adjustments to the tax structure of either of these two
broad categories of income could eliminate any effective-rate creep but not the
taxation of nominal or fictitious income generated solely by inflation. To
neutralize this impact of inflation would require adjustments to the tax base of
interest income. Absent such adjustment, creditors bear the burden of infla-
tion, and debtors reap the benefit. Creditors are taxed on the entire amount of
interest received, regardless of the interest rate's relation to the inflation
rate.'°5 If the interest rate is below the inflation rate, the creditor's asset, the
loan, is really declining in value to the extent of the difference, however, under
current tax law, he is taxed on a nominal gain instead of being allowed a
deduction for the real loss he suffers.'" To offset inflation's impact, the
See TANZI, supra note 45, at 51-62; Downs & Giliberto, How Inflation Erodes the Income
of Fixed-Rate Lenders, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REPRINT 372 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Downs].
The authors take issue with those who assert that, taking a macro-view, taxation of in-
terest among individual taxpayers or as between them as creditors and corporations as borrowers
is in the whole not distorted by inflation. Sunley, supra note 10, at 331-32 (also asserting that
market adjustments made to rate of interest so that no inflation adjustment is necessary). If such
an approach was warranted, taxation of many types of income could be foregone and deduction
of corresponding expenses by other taxpayers denied. The argument that the before tax rate of
interest will adjust to the fact that the inflation component of the interest is taxed, is not born out
by experience. Downs at 45, 50-51 (lenders have not anticipated future increases in the rate of in-
flation, and, thus, have not raised interest rates high enough to offset inflation). Bossons, Indexing
Financial Instruments for Inflation, 22 CAN. TAX J. 107, 109 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bossons II],
(much price inflation is unanticipated); INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 3-4.
At a rate of inflation of 10%, in order to obtain an after tax real interest of 1.5% for a
taxpayer in the 50% marginal tax bracket, an interest rate of 23% is required. At a rate of infla-
tion of 15%, the required rate of interest would be 33%. Despite exceptionally high rates of in-
terest in 1980-1981, such a gap between inflation and interest rates was never recorded
102 I.R.C. S 61(a) (1982).
1" See id. at S 61(a)(4).
104 For example, consider the situation where a creditor makes a loan of $100 at an in-
terest rate of 8% per year when annual inflation is 10%. After one year the creditor receives $8
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creditor should be allowed to deduct from taxable income an amount equal to
the percent of the outstanding principal equivalent to the excess — the rate of
inflation less the rate of interest.' 05 Meanwhile, the debtor is allowed to deduct
his entire interest payment.'" In this situation the debtor really is receiving a
gain, to the extent the inflation rate exceeds the interest rate, yet he is taxed as
if all of the interest payments were a cost item. 10 ' To offset inflation's impact,
the debtor should be required to include as taxable income an amount equal to
the percent of the outstanding principal equivalent to the excess of the inflation
rate over the interest rate. 1 °8 Where the interest rate exceeds the inflation rate,
creditors are only experiencing real gain to the extent of the difference between
these two rates and debtors are only experiencing real loss, or cost, to the same
extent." 8 Therefore, to offset inflation's impact, creditors should only be re-
quired to include as taxable income, and debtors allowed to deduct from tax-
able income, an amount equal to the percent of principal equivalent to the ex-
cess of the interest rate over the inflation rate."° Thus, any adjustment to the
tax base to reflect the real rather than the nominal measurement of taxable in-
come would benefit creditors, and hurt debtors."' This holds true whether
either party is a business or an individual. Therefore, such an inflation adjust-
ment would affect both broad income categories." 2
interest income. The value of the loan's principal has declined to $90 due to inflation —
representing a loss of $10 over the year. The net real value of the asset resulting from receipt of $8
interest income and decline $10 in principal value is a $2 loss on the asset. Under current tax law,
however, the creditor must pay tax on an $8 gain and is allowed no offsetting deduction to ac-
count for the erosion in the loan's principal value due to inflation.
105 See Bossons II, supra note 101, at 114.
106 I.R.C. S 163(a) (1982).
'°' In the example supra note 104, the debtor pays $8 interest, but the value of the prin-
cipal to be repaid has decreased by $10, representing a $2 net gain. Under current tax law,
however, the debtor receives an $8 deduction and reports no gain.
'°° See Bossons II, supra note 101, at 114.
109 For example, consider the situation when a creditor makes a loan of $100 at an in-
terest rate of 12% per year when inflation is 10%. After one year, the creditor receives, and
under current tax law pays taxes upon, $12 interest income. The debtor pays, and under current
tax law deducts, the $12 interest expense. The real value of the loan is then $90 — representing a
$10 loss to the creditor and a $10 gain to the debtor. Netting the interest and principal gains and
expenses, the creditor has experienced a real gain, and the debtor a real expense, of only $2.
See Bossons II, supra note 101, at 114.
'" To the extent that upper-income bracket entities are creditors, and lower-income
bracket entities are borrowers, an inflation adjustment to interest income to reflect a real rather
than a nominal base would represent a redistribution of tax liabilities that is regressive in nature.
This is because creditors now paying taxes on nominal income would be relieved of this liability
and actually receive new deductions, while debtors would lose most of their current deduction
and be required to recognize income if the inflation rate exceeded the interest rate. Also,
historically favored taxpayers, such as homeowners, would suffer from an inflation adjustment to
interest income since they would lose the substantial tax benefit of mortgage interest deductions.
1 " Examples of items generating interest income and deductions affecting both in-
dividual and business income include a home mortgage, where a bank is the creditor and an in-
dividual the debtor, and a corporate bond, where an individual is the creditor and a corporation
is the debtor.
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As with interest income, capital gains income is distorted by inflation and
is a component of overall business and individual income." 3 Inflation ad-
justments to the tax structure can serve merely to eliminate effective-rate creep,
not to neutralize, inflation's impact upon these components of overall income.
Adjustments to the tax base are required to offset inflation's entire impact on
these components. With regard to capital gains, in a nominal system, such as
our current tax system, taxable gain is determined by the excess of sale price
over historical cost basis.'' All or part of this excess may be a fictitious gain
caused by inflation during the holding period rather than a real gain in con-
stant dollars. Therefore, under our current tax system, inflation may result in
over-taxation of income received from the sale of capital assets or other proper-
ty." 5 Thus, during inflationary times, at least part of the tax on gains from the
sale of such properties inevitably will tax equity rather than income. 16 Unlike
interest, income from the sale of a capital asset already receives preferential tax
treatment in most countries."' A capital gains preference that does not
distinguish real from fictitious gains, however, will overcompensate some tax-
payers for inflation while undercompensating other taxpayers for its effects." 8
In the United States, the 60% exlusion for capital gains income"' has general-
'" See TANZI, supra note 45, at 41-50; Grinner, Inflation, Deferral, and the Neutral Taxation
of Capital Gains, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 565 (1973).
" 4 For example, in the United States the sale for $120 of an object purchased for $100
and held less than one year will be taxed as a $20 gain. I.R.C. 5 1001(a), 1011(a) (1976). If infla-
tion between the date of purchase and the date of sale has been 10%, only $10 represents a real
gain in constant dollars. Thus, one half of the $20 taxable gain is a fictitious gain due to inflation,
so taxation of the entire $20 represents overtaxation of the real gain of $10.
" 3 TANZI, SUpra note 45, at 41.
" 6 Id.
'" At least in the United States, preferential tax treatment accorded capital gains has
stemmed from attempts to encourage capital investment rather than an express intent to adjust
for inflation. See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. AULT, I FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 944 (1972).
" 8 For example, in the United States, 60% of the gain on the sale of a capital asset held
more than one year is exempt from taxation, while 40% is taxed at the taxpayer's applicable
marginal rate. I.R.C. 5 1202(a). Assume that two taxpayers, A and B, each in the 50% marginal
tax bracket, sell for $200 a capital asset that has a basis in their hands of $100. Further, assume A
has held his asset for one year and a day while B has held his asset for five years. Under present
tax law, both would be taxed at the rate of 50% on 40% of their gain, resulting in a $20 tax
liability. Id. If inflation were 10% for each of the preceding five years, A's real gain is 90% of his
nominal gain of $100, or $90. If the gain were not given preferred treatment and instead taxed as
ordinary income and if A were taxed at the rate of 50% of his real gain, his tax liability would be
$45. Thus, A has been overcompensated for inflation under current preferential tax laws. Con-
versely, B's real gain would be only 39% of his nominal gain of $100 after compounding inflation
rates, or $39. Treating the gain as ordinary income if B were taxed at the rate of 50% of his real
gain, his tax liability would be $19.50. Thus, B has been undercompensated for inflation under
current tax laws. If the inflation rates were to be above 10% per year, or B's holding period were
to increase, B would become increasingly undercompensated for inflation, reaching a point
where tax was paid on a nominal gain when a real loss exists. See Feldstein, Taxes, Inflation and
Capital Formation, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 347, 348 (1979) (study of capital gains on sales of corporate
stock in 1973 reveals that tax was paid on $4.6 billion nominal gain when taxpayers suffered a
real loss of almost $1 billion).
" 9 I.R.C. 5 1202(a) (1982).
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ly been depicted as operating as a rough correction for inflation's effect on the
cost basis of capital assets. . This fixed-rate exclusion, however, could result in a
lock-in effect during prolonged periods of inflation. As the holding period
lengthens, an increasing portion of the excess of sale price over cost basis may
become fictitious gain generated by inflation rather than real gain. Under the
current American taxation system, especially when inflation-generated fic-
titious gain accounts for more than 60% of the excess of present value over
basis, the taxpayer becomes locked-in with no incentive to sell the property.' 2°
This could be corrected by tax base adjustments which would adjust the basis
of a capital asset or other property to reflect its present worth in constant
terms.'" Compared to current tax treatment, substituting scientific inflation
adjustments to the tax base of capital gains for the 60% exclusion generally
would benefit those taxpayers, both businesses and individuals, who have sold
capital assets held over longer periods of time or during higher periods of infla-
tion, and hurt those taxpayers who have sold capital assets after shorter, or less
inflationary, holding periods.
The effect of interrelations between the various categories and com-
ponents of income described above must be recognized in order to determine
accurately the impact of particular inflation adjustments upon the tax system.
In addition to earned income, individuals are the recipients of interest income,
capital gains, and business income in the form of corporate dividends, pro-
prietorship profits, or partnership interests. Therefore, inflation-adjusting any
of these types of income will affect individual income. In the absence of
neutralizing inflation's impact on all individual income, making any of these
adjustments to other types of income would redistribute tax liabilities in favor
of those individuals receiving the adjusted income. Similarly, part of business
income is produced by the sale of capital assets and receipt of interest. Thus, in
the absence of neutralizing inflation's impact on all business income, adjust-
ment of these types of income would redistribute tax liabilities in favor of those
businesses receiving the adjusted income. Furthermore, if specific assets and
liabilities such as financial instruments were only adjusted for businesses, in-
dividual creditors would suffer vis-a-vis business creditors.' 22
120 As fictitious gains due to inflation increase as a portion of overall gain as currently
determined, the lock-in effect increases regardless of whether fictitious gain exceeds the arbitrary
60% cut-off point. Under current taxation of nominal gain, any tax that is iriggered by realiza-
tion of gain instead of mere accrual will cause a lock-in effort to develop as the nominal value of
the asset being held increases.
' 21 See generally S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, 1 1979 SUPPLE-
MENT TO FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 382 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Supplement] (the
indexing of capital gains should be considered in conjunction with (1) taxing gains at ordinary in-
come rates, (2) imposing an interest gain or tax deferral, and (3) tax accrued gains in property
transferred at death or by gift), Bossons, supra note 91, at 155 (Problems arising from indexing
the cost base of capital assets for eliminating inflation-induced nominal gains have relatively
straight-forward solution.); Blinder, Capital Gains: Tax Them Like Income, Washington Post, July
2, 1982, SA at 19, col. 1. (indexing should be extended to capital gains and tax gains over and
above the general rise in the price level as ordinary income).
122 For example, if corporate bonds were adjusted for inflation only for business holders,
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In summary, once the decision has been made to adjust the income tax
system for inflation, the choice of what types of income to adjust and what type
of adjustment to make, must be faced. Adjustments can be made to the tax
structure or the tax base. Tax structure adjustments can offset inflation's ero-
sion of nominal fixed-dollar amounts in the tax laws. Tax base adjustments can
offset inflation's impact on the measurement of income subject to taxation.
While both types of adjustments are necessary to neutralize inflation's entire
effect on the tax system, either type of adjustment can be made to all or selected
categories of income. The broad categories of individual and business income
are each distorted by inflation and, therefore, are candidates for adjustment. In
addition to these categories, the specific components of income represented by
interest and capital gains are particularly prone to distortion by inflation.
When considering any of these types of income, separately or together, for in-
flation adjustments, their interrelation and the effect that a particular adjust-
ment will have on the entire tax system should be recognized.
4. Whether Adjustments Should be Ad Hoc or Scientific
Once the decision has been made to adjust particular categories of in-
come, attention must next turn to the method of inflation adjustment to be
undertaken. Three alternative methods of inflation adjustment could each pro-
vide an effective offset of inflation's impact. First, ad hoc, discretionary ad-
justments could be undertaken to offset the effects of inflation. These ad-
justments could be made either annually or periodically every few years. Alter-
natively, scientific, automatic adjustments such as indexing could be used to
offset the effects of inflation. Under such automatic adjustments the portion of
the tax system to be adjusted would be linked directly to an index determined
to be the appropriate measure of inflation. Automatic adjustments in the tax
system would then be made in accordance with the rise in the index. Finally,
inflation adjustments to the tax system could be composed of a mixture of
discretionary and automatic adjustments. In this manner, adjustments to the
tax system, or to a particular portion of the tax system could be partially
automatic and partially discretionary. Similarly, some parts of the tax system
could be indexed while other parts would be subject to discretionary ad-
justments.
Even after a decision to inflation-adjust particular portions of the tax
system is made, proponents of such adjustments differ over this choice between
discretionary and automatic adjustments. At the crux of this disagreement is
what amount of flexibility the legislature should retain in shaping budgetary
and tax policy. Opponents of automatic adjustments contend that indexing
would complicate the task of determining budgetary policy.'" Properly drawn,
these automatic adjustments could eliminate the hidden annual increases in
business would be taxed only on real gain while individuals would be taxed on nominal gain.
12' CB0 STUDY, supra note 15, at 19.
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government revenues caused by inflation.'" Supporters of an active and ex-
panded public sector recognize that in some years fiscal restraint, or a balanced
budget, could be obtained only by reducing government expenditures or ex-
plicitly increasing taxes.' 23 Moreover, such persons also recognize that the op-
tion of explicitly increasing taxes, in recent years, has been feasible politically
only in times of national emergency. 126 Major portions of government spend-
ing are already committed, enjoy wide public support, or are backed by a
powerful political lobby. Due to budgetary pressure caused by these com-
mitments, the flexibility to increase the role of the public sector by enacting tax
increases or postponing "tax cuts," or by increasing government spending,
would be reduced greatly under a system of automatic adjustments because of
the lost incremental revenue increase which inflation provides.'" Therefore,
such persons may be led to oppose any automatic adjustments to offset infla-
tion.
A second "flexibility" argument advanced by opponents to indexing is
that such automatic adjustments will "lock-in" the existing distribution of the
tax burden.'" The rationale for this position is that periodic, discretionary ad-
justments to the tax code to offset the effects of inflation would also force con-
tinual scrutiny of the distribution of tax liabilities.'" Such adjustments could
take into account inflation's disproportionate effect on incomes from different
sources and on revenues in general.'" This necessity of continual review would
allow the government in effect, to alter the distribution of tax liabilities and the
amount of progressivity as it sees fit with each discretionary adjustment. Fur-
ther, such critics contend that this ad hoc adjustment process would facilitate
the opportunity for tax review and evaluation, and that meritorious changes in
the tax laws would be less likely under a system of automatic adjustments."'
Thus, any such automatic adjustments are viewed by some people as unwise.
Proponents of automatic inflation adjustments counter these "flexibility"
critiques by arguing that flexibility in a system of discretionary adjustments has
its drawbacks as well and that these drawbacks outweigh any benefits of relying
solely on discretionary adjustments to offset inflation.'" While an unindexed
system of inflation adjustments may ease the political task of setting budgetary
policy, these proponents would argue that such flexibility results in increased
government spending. 13 Under an indexed system, the same increase in
government spending would require either an increased deficit, or an explicit
12 ' See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
129 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 19.
'" Id. (for example during the Vietnam War in 1968-69).
1 " Id.
129 Id. at 23.
"9 Id.
120 See id.
11 Id. at 23-24.
"9 See id. at 19-20.
'" See id.
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tax increase."* Both of these alternatives are more difficult steps for the
legislature to take than is taking no action and receiving an automatic,
inflation-induced gain in government revenues." Thus, proponents would
contend that automatic adjustments promote fiscal restraint.
The second "flexibility" position that reliance on ad hoc adjustments will
promote continued reevaluation of the tax laws is countered in two ways. First,
there is no reason why offsetting inflation by adopting indexing forecloses
future changes in the distribution of tax benefits.' 36 Other countries that have
adopted various forms of indexing have made subsequent ad hoc changes." 7
Second, and more importantly, adoption of an automatic adjustment pro-
cedure would provide future legislators with more time to consider the merits of
altering the distribution of tax liabilities, or of major tax law review, because a
large amount of time would not be continually required for the purpose of
designing adjustments to offset past inflation.' 38 In this regard, reliance upon
frequent ad hoc, discretionary adjustments provides the vehicle for enacting
numerous special interest tax breaks that might lack the support necessary to
pass as a separate bill.'" Hence, automatic adjustments are seen as superior,
in the long run, to ad hoc, discretionary adjustments.
One final consideration when deciding whether to make discretionary or
automatic inflation adjustments is the extent of wage indexation."° Where a
large part of the population has its taxable income automatically linked to a
measure of inflation, a stronger argument can be made to automatically
inflation-adjust taxes. Without such automatic tax adjustment, a rise in infla-
tion will cause more disproportionate increases in tax revenues in a country
with extensive wage indexation than in a country without extensive wage in-
dexation. Similarly, where a high percentage of the population's wages are in-
dexed with one index, the strength of the argument supporting use of that in-
dex to adjust taxes also increases."'
In resolving this choice between ad hoc and automatic adjustments to off-
set the effects on inflation or a tax system, most commentators would agree that
ad hoc, discretionary adjustments are adequate to cope with "low" levels of in-
'" Id. at 20.
'" See id. at 19.
16 Congress has
periods in the past, i.e. in
note 30, at 294-96.
'" CB0 STUDY,
I" See id.
199 Id
made major changes in the tax code during relatively inflation-free
1954 and 1964. Id. at 24. See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra
supra note 15, at 24 (Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands).
' 4° For example, cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) clauses in employment contracts
tied to some index of cost-of-living or inflation. In the United States, more than 8.5 million
workers were covered by collective bargaining contracts that included such clauses tied to the
Consumer Price Index. C. CLARK & L. SCHKADE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR AD-
MINISTRATIVE DECISION 501 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ANALYSIS].
111 See generally infra note 223.
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flation.42 Moreover, most also would agree that automatic adjustments
become desirable at "high" levels of inflation."3 The question then becomes at
what level of inflation do automatic adjustments become necessary? In this
regard, it is useful to examine foreign experience with automatic inflation ad-
justments in order to observe the points at which other nations have deter-
mined that automatic adjustments were called for.
During the 1970's, a survey of foreign experience shows that the countries
of Argentina, Australia, Canada and Columbia enacted indexing provisions to
automatically offset the entire inflationary impact on their individual income
tax structures with Israel reaching this stage by 1981.144 Several additional
countries, including Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and Sweden provided for partial-indexing that offset some of in-
141 See, e.g., Sunley, supra note 10, at 332.
Id.
144 Ruppe, supra note 10, at 113-14 (Argentina, Australia, Canada); TANZI, Supra note
45, at 23-40, 150 (Argentina, Australia, Canada); ROSENN, supra note 76, at 329-31 (Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Colombia); Gubbay & Sheshinski, The Influence of Taxation, Transfer
Payments, and Subsidies on Income Distribution 23-24, (1981) (unpublished paper); Israel And
Uruguay also had such a system before abolishing its individual income tax in 1974. TANZI, supra
note 45, at 27-28. Argentina enacted automatic indexing of exemption, deduction and minimum
taxable income levels in 1974, with inflation at approximately 37%. Reig, National Report: Argen-
tina, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 181, 184, 193, 196 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). Argen-
tina enacted automatic indexing of income tax brackets in 1976, when inflation surpassed 400%.
Id. at 196; TANZI, Supra note 45, at 27. Australia enacted automatic indexing of income tax
brackets, tax credits, and the standard deduction in 1976, with inflation at 13.0% that year and
16.7% a year earlier. Bratby & Orrock, National Report: Australia, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L.
201, 203, 214 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). In 1976 and 1977 these components were in-
dexed by the full rate of inflation. J. DAVIS, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL REPORT ON TOPIC HAW
TO THE XI INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 1, 3 (Caracas, Venezuela
1982). In 1978 and 1980, however, they were indexed by less than the full rate of inflation and in
1979 they were not indexed at all. Id. at 3-4. In 1981, the Federal Treasurer announced that in-
dexation would be abolished beginning with the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1982. Id. at 4 and
n.8. Canada enacted automatic indexation of the basic, marital, dependent, old-age, and
disability exemption, as well as the progressive tax brackets in 1973, with inflation at 7.5%. See
Kelley, supra note 13, at 20; Bodard & Lees, National Report: Canada, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL
L. 283, 283-81 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). After returning to power in 1980, the liberal
government advocated limiting indexing to a maximum percent rather than indexing to offset
current double digit inflation. In 1982 the government of Canada proposed maximum indexation
of 6% in 1983 and 5% in 1984. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Budget — June 28, 1982 (July 1982).
Israel enacted partial indexing in 1975 with inflation over 30%. Peck, National Report:
Israel, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 377, 380-81 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). See Rafael,
supra note 67, at 198-200. From 1975 to 1980, twice each year tax brackets were adjusted most of
the time only by 70% of the inflation rate, while credits were fully adjusted. Draft Law 1523 of
Mar. 9, 1981 of the Law for the Amendment of the Income Tax Ordinance (No. 45). Beginning
in 1980, with inflation surpassing 100%, Israel provided indexation of brackets four times each
year while retaining full indexation of credit twice annually. Although the Finance Minister re-
tains the authority, with the consent of the Finance Committee of the Knesset, to restrict indexa-
tion to 70% of the inflation rate, the practice since then has been full indexation of the market
and credits. Ste id. By 1981, due to the earlier partial indexing of brackets, "bracket-creep" had
set in as compared to the 1975 schedule, increasing the proportion of taxpayers in the highest
marginal rate from 1.2% to 15%. Id. In 1975 72% of taitpayers paid the lowest marginal rate
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flation's impact on their tax structures.'" Meanwhile, the countries of
Finland, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and West Germany relied on
discretionary adjustments to counter inflation's effect on their tax structures,
even when inflation reached higher levels than those at which other countries
chose to implement automatic adjustments.'" The results of this survey show
that only three countries enacted even partial indexing when the inflation rate
was below 5%. Of these three, two partially indexed systems provided for ad-
justments only when inflation exceeded 5% , 147 and the third allowed for discre-
while by 1981 only 35% fell into this bracket. Id. As a result, the following new tax brackets were
introduced in 1981 to offset this severe erosion due to partial indexation:
ISRAEL — PERCENT OF WAGE EARNERS IN TAX BRACKETS
TAX RATE NEW BRACKETS (APRIL 1981) OLD BRACKETS (MARCH 1981)
25% 50% 35%
35 20 31
45 15 11
50 10 13
60 5 10
See id.
'" Belgium enacted partial indexing in 1967 with inflation at 12.8%. Dupont, National
Report: Belgium, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 251 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). Brazil
enacted partial indexing in 1964 with inflation at over 100% and revised it in 1967 with inflation
at 30.5%. d'Almeiden & Neviani, National Report: Brazil, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 271, 272
(1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). Denmark enacted partial indexing in 1969 with inflation at 3%
and revised it in 1974 with inflation at 16%. TANZI, supra note 38, at 38; Kjuer, National Report:
Denmark, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 295, 296, 298 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). France
enacted partial indexing in 1968 with inflation at 4.5%. Meary, National Report: France, 62 STUD.
ON INT'L FISCAL L. 351, 362 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). Luxembourg enacted partial in-
dexing in 1967 with inflation under 5%. TANZI, supra note 38, at 31; Arendt, Deckler & Bernard,
National Report: Luxembourg, 62 STUD. ON INTL FISCAL L. 425, 431 (1977) (IFA Conference
Vienna). The Netherlands enacted partial indexing in 1971 with inflation at 7.9% and revised it
in 1973 with inflation at 8.2%. Meeles, National Report: Netherlands, 62 STUD. ON INT'', FISCAL L.
461, 462, 466 (1977) (IFA Conference). Sweden enacted partial indexing in 1977 following three
years of inflation over 10%. TANZI, supra note 38, at 29; Grasskopf, National Report: Sweden, 62
STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 493 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna).
146 Finland enacted a law in 1974, with inflation at 17.9%, requiring that the govern-
ment in specific legislation adjust both tax rates and brackets due to inflation each year. Raiha,
National Report: Finland, 62 STUD. ON IN1"L FISCAL L. 341, 341-42 (1977) (IFA Conference Vien-
na). Japan has enacted regular, discretionary tax reductions since 1957 aimed at offsetting infla-
tion. Sato, National Report:Japan, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 411, 414 (1977) (IFA Conference
Vienna). Inflation in Japan, which averaged just over 5% in the late 1960's, peaked at almost
25% in 1974. Id. at 412 (cost-of-living table). Norway enacted annual discretionary adjustments
throughout the 1970's with inflation ranging from 6% to over 11%. Odegard, National Report:
Norway, 62 STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 451, 451-52 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). The
United Kingdom reviewed its tax structure annually by the late 1970's. Dobson, United Kingdom:
Budget 1977, 17 EUROPEAN TAX. 125 (1977). Inflation in the United Kingdom was over 10%
throughout most of the 1970's, reaching 23% in 1975. Expley, National Report: United Kingdom, 62
STUD. ON INT'L FISCAL L. 479 (1977) (IFA Conference Vienna). West Germany made only
discretionary adjustments to its tax structure in the 1970's, with inflation averaging just over 5%.
Piltz, National Report: West Germany, 62 STUD. ON IN'I"L FISCAL L. 161, 178 (1977) (IFA Con-
ference Vienna) (English Summary).
147 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 223 (France — annual inflation
must exceed 5%; Luxembourg — annual inflation must exceed 5% or cumulative inflation since
last adjustment must exceed 10%).
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tion as to the application of indexing.'" Two additional countries enacted in-
dexing of the tax structure when the rate of inflation was between 7.5% and
10%, one provided for full indexation, 149 the other for partial indexation.' 5°
On the one hand, ad hoc, discretionary adjustments would allow the
legislature to retain the flexibility to time and target adjustments so as to reap
maximum political gain based on the particular situation. In addition to in-
dicating a desire to retain flexibility, a decision to rely on this type of adjust-
ment may indicate the belief that inflation will remain at a relatively low level,
capable of being periodically offset without requiring continual legislative time
and effort. On the other hand, scientific, automatic adjustments would remove
legislative power to time or target adjustments and would require increasing
either taxes or the deficit in order to increase government spending. The ad-
justments would be automatically tied to an index and would be made to reflect
changes in the index without additional legislative action. In addition to in-
dicating a desire to require explicit action to increase spending or alter the tax
burden, the choice of automatic adjustments may reflect the belief that infla-
tion will become, or remain, relatively high in the foreseeable future. In light of
the legislature's other concerns, in an era of high inflation the burden of deter-
mining specific discretionary adjustments may become too time consuming
without automatic adjustments, and such automatic adjustments would
therefore provide the best means for responding to the effect of inflation upon
the tax system.
In summary, certain preliminary factors should be considered before a
decision is made to implement inflation adjustments to the tax system. The in-
itial factors to examine include the primarily political and psychological con-
siderations related to the question of whether taxes should be inflation-
adjusted. If general agreement is reached to adjust income taxes, attention
then focuses upon the choice of which parts of the tax system are to be adjusted,
and what type of inflation adjustment is to be made. Factors to be considered at
this point include the effects of inflation on various categories of income, as well
as the potential which each type of adjustment, whether to the structure or the
base, possesses to eliminate these effects. An additional factor is the inter-
relatedness of the various categories and components of income. In this regard,
a decision to make either type of adjustment to any given part or parts of the
tax system should be analyzed to determine its impact on other parts of the tax
system. Even if agreement is reached concerning the categories of income to be
adjusted and the type of adjustment to make, alternative methods of imple-
menting the desired adjustments exist. The adjustments can be discretionary,
automatic, or a combination of some discretionary and some automatic ad-
justments. Again at this point, the relevant factors to consider are primarily
148 TANZI, supra note 45, at 38 (Denmark, in 1970 — Parliament to vote whether to ap-
ply the adjustment and to determine extent of adjustment).
"9 Canada. National Report: Canada, supra note 144, at 283-84.
15° The Netherlands. National Report: Netherlands, supra note 144, at 462, 466.
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political. These factors include the difficulty of formulating budgetary policy,
the desirability of altering the existing tax burden, the opportunity for major
tax review, as well as the expected level of future inflation. If consideration of
these preliminary factors results in a decision to automatically index the tax
structure as it relates to various categories of income, a secondary set of factors
becomes relevant.
B. Secondary Factors — Options for Indexing
Once a decision has been made to adjust the tax structure by means of
automatic adjustments based on some measure of inflation, the appropriate in-
dexing system must be designed. The design decisions in this secondary stage
involve the consideration of at least four factors: 1) whether a single index or
multiple indexes should be used; 2) which index or indexes should be used;
3) whether to adjust taxes for the entire change in the index or indexes; and
4) how timing considerations will be reflected in the indexing.
Unlike the considerations in the primary stage of a decision to adjust taxes
for inflation, which tend to be heavily political, the considerations present in
the secondary stage, once the decision to index has been made, tend to be more
technical. In the primary stage of such a decision, it is difficult if not impossible
to reach normative conclusions because the conclusion depends in large part on
the individual's political viewpoint. In the secondary stage, however, when ap-
propriate design of an indexing system is at issue, it becomes possible to reach
some conclusions concerning design of a system that can effectively and effi-
ciently carry out a political decision to offset inflation's effect on the targeted
areas of income.
1. How Many Indexes to Use.
If taxes are to be inflation-adjusted automatically by indexing, one of the
first design considerations that must be addressed is how many indexes should
be used. A single general index could be used for all taxpayers, or multiple in-
dexes representing particular geographic regions in which they live, particular
income classes in which they fit, or particular goods and services which they
buy, could be used. All countries now using indexing have chosen to use a
single index and a single base period for all income tax structure
adjustments.'" Although living costs and incomes differ sociologically and
geographically, the practical difficulties in using multiple indexes and deter-
mining which should apply to each taxpayer group or geographic region would
be enormous. 152
The existing tax structure in the United States does not take account of
differing costs-of-living in various geographical areas or income classes in
' 51 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 242. Since only individual in-
come taxes have been indexed, countries have not had to decide whether to use different indexes
when corporations were involved. Id. at n. 15.
' 5' See Ruppe, supra note 10, at 114.
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determining tax liability.153 Regardless of geographic differences in living
costs, taxpayers throughout the country with the same dollar incomes from the
same sources pay the same tax.'m While a comparison of separate geographic
indexes indicates noticeable differences between geographic areas,"5 a com-
parison of separate income class indexes does not reflect major differences be-
tween various income level groups. "6 Where such conditions have no influence
in setting the initial tax structure, it has been argued that there is no point in
introducing automatic adjustments based on these differences.'" Unless it is
decided that the original structure should reflect such differences in the base
costs, it follows that the adjustments should not reflect these differences in sub-
sequent costs in the adjusted structure. Furthermore, since taxpayers move
from one region or income class to another, a system using multiple indexes
would require a complex rule to permit the averaging of index adjustments
across regions or income classes for taxpayers whose positions have changed
during the relevant tax period.'"
It would also be an impossible task to base multiple indexes on an in-
dividual's actual purchases or costs. If the objective of indexing is to offset in-
flation's effect on taxation, then only changes or differences in relative prices
due to inflation should be taken into account.'" Changes in relative prices,
however, are in large part due to the effects of supply and demand independent
of inflation.'" Even if these problems in deriving individual indexes and deter-
mining how much of the change in the indexes was due to inflation could be
solved, a system using so many indexes would be impractical."' It may be
"3 C130 STUDY, supra note 15, at 34. Yet regional prices may effect tax liability, for ex-
ample, if two taxpayers from different states receive the same type of car as a prize in a contest,
their current tax treatment would be different if the retail price of that particular car model varied
between the two areas (e.g. Detroit, Michigan and Fairbanks, Alaska) because the amount in-
cluded in income would be the fair market value of the car as determined by the local market. See
Treas. Regs. 5 1.71-1(a)(2) (1982).
If regional indexes were to be used, as a practical matter the CPI would have to be the
index choice. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. The GNP deflator-based indexes are
calculated for the nation as a whole. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. Ad-
ministratively, it would prove an overwhelming burden to formulate uniform state-wide, or
regional, indexes for all areas of the country comparable to a GNP deflator. While regional CPI
indexes are easier to formulate and currently are available for many areas, GNP deflator-type in-
dexes are not available for most areas.
154 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 236.
"5 Id. at 237, 240-41. Advocates of regional indexing should consider whether the use of
more than one index would withstand constitutional challenge, premised on different effective
tax rates under what is supposed to be a uniform federal tax law. Such challenges might be based
on substantive due process grounds. Situations where different burdens are applied regionally for
arguably "similar" incomes, however, exist under current tax law. See supra note 153. So long as
the indexing method used provided a neutral and objective standard for offsetting inflation the
use of multiple indexes appears likely to withstand any constitutional challenge.
156 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 239-40.
157 Id. at 237.
CB0 STUDY, supra note 15, at 34.
159 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 237.
160 Id. at 238.
161 Id.
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possible to establish a few indexes which accurately represent large groups of
taxpayers. The available evidence, however, suggests that differences between
indexes representing purchases of various taxpayer groups are not large."' If
this is so, it does not matter greatly whether a single index or separate group in-
dexes are used.' 63
Finally, from a social and political viewpoint, it would be undesirable to
have continual debate among various groups about which group is favored
more by a particular index or base year. 1 fi4 Practical administrative considera-
tions would rule out individual indexes for all taxpayers, in addition, the ap-
propriate number and composition of groups to base indexes upon is difficult to
determine.' 65 Beyond these administrative problems, even where some limit is
placed on the number of indexes, inequities that multiple indexes would seek to
remedy might still remain. For instance, living costs can vary considerably
within broad groupings such as geographic regions or income classes.'" This
difference might not be accounted for when a limit is placed on the number of
indexes. So long as the basic tax system to be adjusted ignores differences
among taxpayers and sets tax liabilities without regard to such differences, the
case for using the same general index for all taxpayers seems compelling.
2. Which Index to Use
Once the decision is made to use a single index to adjust the tax structure
one must decide which index should be used to measure inflation. This choice
depends on the political goals or tax policy objectives which the government
desires to achieve by indexing. Different indexes are based upon different
measures of income. Under a progressive tax system, a rise in the taxpayer's
income raises his tax liability as a percentage of that income whether the gain is
due to inflation or real growth measured in constant dollars. I 6 7 If the objective
of indexing is to prevent any automatic rise in government revenue from a tax-
payer whose income is not rising faster than the national average, whether due
to real growth or inflation, the appropriate index would be based on some
measure of average per capita income.'" An average income-based index
would avoid both nominal concealed progression and real concealed progres-
sion. 1 6 9 Both Denmark and Iceland have opted for an average income-based in-
dex.'" If, however, a government's objective is only to offset increased govern-
62 Id.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 238-39.
166 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 34.
166 Id.
167 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 243-44.
1 " Id. at 244. In 1966, Vito Tanzi proposed such a system based on an index of per
capita income. Id. & n.19. (citing TANZI, A Proposal for a Dynamically Self-Adjusting Personal Income
Tax, 21 PUBLIC FINANCE 507-19 (1966)).
166 Ruppe, supra note 10, at 115.
' 7° Id.; INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, suPra note 30, at 218.
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ment tax revenues due to inflation, a price-based index would be
appropriate.'" All countries other than Denmark and Iceland which currently
provide some form of indexed adjustments use a price-based index.'"
In designing an indexing system under current policies and laws, which
provide for a progressive rate structure, a price based index is more ap-
propriate than an average income based index. Increases in tax liabilities due
to inflation, not those due to real growth, are the appropriate target for
American indexing. Only the former are accounted for when a price based in-
dex is used. In addition to most foreign countries that have enacted indexing,
the current American proposals also use a price index. Thus, the remainder of
this section will address the issue of which index to use only in the context of the
relevant price changes to consider.
Two alternate types of price index exist, thus, the primary question is
which type should be used.'" One choice is to use a consumption price index
that measures only those changes in consumer prices due to inflation that
reflect income earned when producing goods for consumers." If the goal of in-
dexing is to offset the effects of higher prices due to inflation on the taxpayers
real income, a measure of consumer price increases would be appropriate,"
because linking tax indexation to such an index will cause income taxes to be
adjusted solely to offset inflation's impact on prices of consumer goods. The
alternative is a national income price index that reflects changes, due to infla-
tion, in prices of the national output. This would reflect income earned in pro-
ducing goods and services for all final purchasers. 16 If the goal of indexing is to
prevent the share of total personal income required to pay taxes from rising
solely due to inflation, such a measure of the effects of inflation on all incomes
would be appropriate, because income taxes would then be adjusted to offset
inflation's impact on all income rather than only the income from the produc-
tion of consumer goods."
In the United States, readily available indexes constructed to reflect
changes in consumer prices include the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Households (CPI-U) prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Depart-
ment of Labor 18 and the implicit price deflator for personal consumption ex-
penditure (PCE), prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. 179
in See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 243-44.
'" See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
1" See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 258 (The major choice to be
made is between a comprehensive [price] series and one restricted to consumption. Id.).
74 See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30 at 249.
175 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 29.
"6 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 249 .
17 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 29.
179 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 140, at 501.
179 Reconciliation of Quarterly Changes in Measures of Prices Paid by Consumers, SURVEY OF
CURRENT Bus. 6, 6 (March 1978) [hereinafter cited as Reconciliation].
While the PCE deflator covers all United States residents, (Letter from J.C.Byrnes,
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The CPI-U is a fixed-weighted index, reflecting the change in constant
1967 dollars of prices of a fixed quantity market-basket based on 1972-1973
consumption.'" The Commerce Department's PCE deflator is based on the
change in constant 1972 dollars of prices of a current market basket. Is' Since
the PCE deflator uses a current market basket, quantities of goods and services
currently purchased, both changing prices and changing quantities purchased
will be reflected. 182 The Commerce Department also publishes a PCE fixed-
weighted price index based on the change in constant 1972 dollars of prices of a
Chief, Consumption Branch, National Income and Wealth Division, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Department of Commerce to Charles P. Shimer p.2 (August 1981) (Form letter
response to request for information regarding consumer price indexes) [hereinafter cited as Let-
ter]), the CPI-U covers only about 80% of this group, ignoring the farm population, the institu-
tional population, and those temporarily abroad. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 140, at 501.
Although there are numerous, but frequently compensating, differences in these two measures,
the most important difference between the PCE deflator and the CPI-U for the period 1978
through 1982 is the treatment of home ownership costs. See Letter, supra at 2; Reconciliation, supra
at 6, 9; Inflation and the Income Tax, supra note 30, at 257 n.38. During this period, the CPI-U
calculated home ownership costs based on the assumption that all home owners have mortgages
at prevailing interest rates. Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1981 at 25, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Wall St.
J.]. This index did not, therefore, reflect home owners with old mortgages or below-market rates.
Id. The PCE deflator calculates home ownership costs based on a "rental-equivalency" method,
using a rent index to compute space rent for owner-occupied dwellings. Reconciliation, supra at 9.
In October .1981, the Labor Department announced plans to begin using "rental-equivalency"
in 1983 to calculate the CPI-U home ownership costs. Wall St. J., at 25, col. 3. This switch will
result in smaller increases in the CPI-U when interest and home mortgage rates are rising, and
might result in larger increases if mortgage rates decline. See id. at col. 5. Use of "rental-
equivalency" in fiscal 1981 would have resulted in a rise in this index 1.8% lower than that ac-
tually calculated. Id. at col. 4. Representatives of organized labor unions, whose members' con-
tracts are tied to the CPI-U, immediately complained about the change, which will result in
lower wage increases in the future if because of the change the index uses more slowly. Id. at col.
5-6. Over time, however, this change may not affect the index significantly, as its impact causes
quicker rises in the index when interest rates fall. See id. at col. 5. This change in the computation
of the CPI-U has raised questions concerning the possibilities of government intervention in data
collection, or manipulation of data used to achieve desired results in the publicized level of price
changes. See id.
I" STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 140 at 501. The CPI-U is designed to measure
the effect of price changes of about 400 items of almost everything consumers buy for living,
called a "market basket" of goods and services. Id. The market basket was developed from a de-
tailed consumer expenditure survey of 20,000 families and single individuals conducted in 1972
and 1973. Id. The CPI-U is a chain price index which is a modified Laspeyres-type index. M. at
499, 501. As a chain index, the CPI-U has a moving base, the month immediately preceding the
month of the index. M. Average price changes from the previous month are expressed in percent-
age terms for each item, and the percentage changes of all items covered are combined using a
formula and, thus resulting in a chain index number. Id. at 501. The resulting number is
multiplied by the index number for the previous month and divided by 100 to obtain a fixed-base
index number with 1967 as the base. Id. at 501-02.
1 " Letter, supra note 179, at 1. As a price index, the PCE implicit price deflator may be
described as an index in which prices relative to 1972 are averaged with weights consisting of
quantities currently purchased valued in constant 1972 prices. Id. The PCE implicit price
deflator is obtained by dividing personal consumption expenditures valued in current prices by
personal consumption expenditures valued in constant 1972 prices. M. The change in the
resulting index figure from the previous period's figure is best interpreted as the change in the
average price paid for goods and services purchased in each period. Id.
"" See id. at 1.
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fixed market basket based on 1972 consumer expenditures.'" Notwithstanding
other differences, if home ownership costs were measured similarly, the CPI-U
and the PCE fixed-weighted index would reflect approximately the same
changes from 1978 through 1982.1"
Both the CPI-U and the PCE implicit price deflator reflect only personal
consumption and the income earned in producing consumer goods. Measures
of national output, which reflect business and government consumption as well
as personal consumption, are another means of measuring "income. 185
Readily available indexes constructed to reflect changes in the prices of total
national output include the Gross National Product (GNP) implicit price
deflator's' and the GNP fixed-weighted price index,'" prepared by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce. The GNP implicit
price deflator is a shifting-weight index reflecting the change in constant 1972
dollars of prices of quantities currently purchased, a current market basket."8
The GNP fixed-weighted price index, however, reflects the change in constant
1972 dollars of fixed 1972 quantities, a fixed market basket."9
Whether examining consumer price indexes or national output price in-
dexes, a fixed-weight index adjusted infrequently for changes in consumption
patterns risks overestimating the impact of a price rise, if consumption of that
10 Id. The fixed-weighted index uses 1972 weights, and is obtained by averaging cur-
rent prices relative to 1972 prices with weights consisting of nominal expenditures in 1972. Id.
The fixed-weighted index reflects only price change. Id. The Commerce Department also
publishes a PCE chain price index. Id. at 2. The chaini price index also reflects only price change
and is calculated only for a single period rather than as a time series. Id. Current prices relative to
the prior period are averaged with weights consisting of nominal expenditures in the prior period.
Id. To the extent that relative prices and quantities change subsequent to the box period, the im-
plicit price deflator may be expected to show a smaller increase or larger decrease than com-
parable fixed-weighted price indexes with a common base period. Id.
Id. at 2.
185 See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, Supra note 30, at 249.
186 As a price index, the GNP deflator reflects the changes in the market price of all
goods and services produced domestically. CB0 STUDY, supra note 15, at 31. Thus, it also
reflects any changes in income earned in producing goods and services for all final purchases. Id.
at 31-32; See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 249. The GNP deflator, like the
PCE deflator which is one of its components, uses a current market basket or shifted weighting
and is a Paasche-type index. See id. at 250 n. 28; CB0 STUDY supra note 15, at 31 & n.5.
Although not as readily available or widely known, component deflators of national out-
put can be calculated. See CB0 STUDY, Supra note 15, at 31 & n.5. The Net National Product
(NNP – GNP - depreciation) implicit price deflator, and the National Income (NI – NNP - in-
direct business taxes - private transfer payments - current surplus of government enterprises +
subsidies) implicit price deflator are also indexes that can be calculated reflecting national output.
INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 248-49.
18' The GNP fixed weight price index is a supplementary price index to the GNP figure
published by the Commerce Department. See id. at 250 n.28. This index uses a fixed market
basket, like the CPI-U index, based upon quantities purchased in 1972. See BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS STAFF PAPER, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY GNP
ESTIMATES REVISITED IN A DOUBLE-DIGIT INFLATIONARY ECONOMY 28 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF PAPER].
158 See STAFF PAPER, Supra note 187, at 23, 27.
189 Id. at 23, 28.
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component is reduced.' 9° Over periods of time, consumption habits change
and the base period quantities reflected in the fixed market basket become out-
dated. As the market basket changes, the fixed-weighted index becomes less ac-
curate and overcompensates for inflation. Changes in consumption patterns
reflect changes in consumer taste as well as inflation's impact on prices. For ex-
ample, in the 1980's, an index reflecting fixed quantities based on early 1970's
expenditures greatly overemphasizes energy consumption and automobile pur-
chases thus giving a distorted measurement of inflation. 19 ' Such fixed-weighted
indexes, therefore, are inferior measurements of inflation compared to current
market basket indexes.'"
Various arguments are made on the one hand in support of using a con-
sumer price index as a basis for adjusting a tax system to offset for the effects of
inflation. Other countries providing indexed tax adjustments based on a price
index use an index of consumer prices to reflect inflation. 193 As a practical mat-
ter, consumer price indexes already enjoy a high level of public familiarity and
acceptance.'" Second, some proponents of a consumption index contend that
changes in real consumption opportunities should bring changes in taxable in-
come. 195 This argument is particularly appealing to those holding the view that
the progressive tax system represents a political judgment to tax households en-
joying the same consumption opportunities at the same rates. 196 Third, since
many Americans' incomes are already linked to the CPI-U, it is logical to use
this index to adjust income taxes.' 97 As of 1979, in the United States, 8.5
million workers had contracts tied to the CPI-U and another 50 million Social
Security beneficiaries and retirees had benefits tied to the CPI-U.' 98
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made for indexing taxes
based on a total national income, or output price, index. ' 99 This position views
the purpose for indexing the tax system as that of preventing changes in the
general price level, inflation, from changing the ratio of income taxes to the
value of the national output. 2" In other words, the goal of adjusting a tax
199 See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 31.
'" See id.
199 See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 250-51 & n.28 (shifting
weight Paasche-type index preferable for purposes of inflation-adjusting taxes to fixed weight
Laspeyres-type index).
19+ Id. at 246; CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 30 & n.3.
19+ See CEO STUDY, supra note 15, at 29, 30.
196 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 264 (comments by R. J. Gor-
don).
'96 Id. This argument loses much of its validity when studied in light of the present tax
system. Different tax liabilities apply to the same amount of capital gains income and ordinary
income, I.R.C. 55 16I(a), 1201(a), 1222(11) yet equal amounts of after-tax income, whether de-
rived from capital or wages, represent the same "consumption opportunities."
19+ See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 140, at 501; CBO STUDY supra note 15, at 30.
198 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 140, at 501.
' 99 See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 249-58; CEO STUDY, supra
note 15, at 30-31.
200 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 247; CEO STUDY, supra note
15, at 30.
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system for the effects of inflation is to make the ratio of real tax on a given
amount of real income invariant to inflation."' Since personal income is de-
rived from the production and sale of goods and services to all final purchasers
— private consumers, businesses, governments, and foreigners — the relevant
price index should reflect an increase in prices paid by any of these groups, not
just private consumers.'" According to this view, using any one of the national
output deflators would be better than using a consumption price index. 203 In
addition, public familiarity with, and acceptance of, at least one national out-
put index, the GNP deflator, is also relatively high, although perhaps not as
high as for the CPI.'"
On balance, it seems preferable to use a national income index when ad-
justing an income tax to offset the impact of inflation. The existing tax system
measures and assesses tax liabilities based on income.'" Within the present
framework, therefore, an attempt to neutralize inflation's impact on taxes
should be directed at offsetting its impact on the basis of the system — income.
Consumption, or even the opportunity to consume, is not a basis on which
federal taxes have been levied. 206 Given that income is the tax base, some index
of national income which reflects inflation's impact on income should be used
to adjust the income taxes for inflation."' Theoretically, therefore, the correct
index would be the one whose context most accurately represents taxable in-
come. 208
To determine which index most accurately represents taxable income
would require resort to an index that measures income from all taxable
sources, not to one that only measures income from selected sources or one that
measures how income recipients spend their taxable income. 209 In theory, an
index which reflects national output produced for all purchasers, not just for
consumers, will represent all taxable income and, thus, can be used to indicate
changes in that income due to inflation. 210 As a practical matter, the issue
would come down to which index, be it a consumption price index or a national
output index, actually reflected taxable income more accurately. The defini-
tion of taxable income most closely corresponds to an implicit price deflator
derived from the GNP deflator: the National Income (NI) deflator. 2 "
2°"
	
AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 247-48; CBO STUDY, supra note
15, at 30.
262
	 AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 249.
203 Id. at 257-58; CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 32.
204 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 268.
203
	 I.R.C. §§ 1, 61 (1982).
206 See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 267. See also supra note 196
and accompanying text.
20r
	 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 247, 249, 267.
208 See id. at 249.
209 Id.
200 See id.
2" Id. at 249-50. The NI deflator represents GNP - depreciation - indirect bUsiness taxes
- private transfer payments - current surplus of government enterprises + subsidies. See supra
note 186.
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Of the more familiar indexes available today, the GNP deflator represents
the best practical choice of an index by which to inflation adjust income taxes.
Although many analysts theoretically prefer the NI derivative," 2 in recent
practice changes in the GNP deflator have been very similar to those in the NI
deflator." 3 The differences among annual figures for either deflator are much
less than those between either deflator and any consumption price index. 214
The GNP deflator reflects income from production for all final purchasers, not
just consumers, and it is a current market-basket index."' Thus, the GNP
deflator possesses the primary characteristics that should be exhibited by an in-
dex used to neutralize inflation's impact upon the income tax structure. 216
3. Whether to Adjust Taxes for the Entire Change in the Index
Once the appropriate index is decided upon, the next choice is whether to
adjust the selected components of the tax system for the entire change in the in-
dex. In this regard, there are three basic options. First, the components could
be adjusted annually to reflect the full rise in the index. 2 " Full, annual ad-
justments offset the entire increase in tax revenues due to inflation, regardless
of the rate of inflation. Second, the components could be adjusted annually by
some fraction of the rise in the index or the adjustments could be limited to a
maximum level even if the rate of inflation is higher. 218 A design incorporating
this option allows the discretionary option of adjusting taxes by more than the
fraction or maximum because it only partially offsets the inflation induced in-
crease in tax revenues. 2 " Third, the components could be adjusted
automatically only when inflation reached or passed a set leve1. 220 This would
implement indexing, either full or fractional, when inflation is high and allow
for discretionary action when inflation remains below the predetermined level.
A survey of the foreign experience shows that each of these options has
been adopted at some point in the indexing systems of various countries. Five
countries enacted an indexing system that provided for annual adjustment in
tax brackets and/or exemptions to reflect the full rise in the relevant index."'
212 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 32 n.7. See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra,
note 30, at 249-50; ROSENN, supra note 76, at 345.
2" CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 32.
114
	 AND THE INCOME TAX, supra, note 30, at 257-58.
Ill See supra notes 185, 188 and accompanying text.
216 It should be emphasized that the choice of this index is primarily for use as an
automatic adjustment to the tax structure. Various automatic adjustments to the tax base,
perhaps, should be based upon other indexes. See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note
30, at 268. But this again raises the issue whether to use multiple indexes for the adjustment proc-
ess.
2" TANZI, supra note 45, at 16, 23, 29.
218 CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 41-42.
2" Id. at 42.
2" Id. at 39.
221 The first option, full annual adjustment in tax brackets and exemptions to reflect the
rise in an index has been enacted in three countries: Argentina, TANZI, supra note 45, at 26-27;
Australia, Id. at 24-26; National Report: Australia, supra note 144, at 214 (Australia abolished in-
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Several other countries adopted a design in which annual adjustments reflected
only a portion of the rise in the selected index.'" This design has left room for
discretionary tax adjustments or targeted relief, as well as additional budget
flexibility."' Two countries adopted variations of the third option in their in-
dexing system, applying automatic indexing only when inflation reaches a
dexing beginning July 1982. See Davis, supra note 131 at 4); Canada, TANZI, supra note 45, at
23-24; National Report: Canada, supra note 144, at 283-84; Kelley, supra note 13, at 20; (The Cana-
dian government acted to limit the maximum level of indexing in 1982. See Delvite, Haskin, &
Sells, supra note 144.); and is practiced for brackets and credits also in Israel, Gubbay & Sheshin-
ski, supra note 144, at 23-24. In addition, Sweden provides for full annual adjustments in
brackets only, TANZI, supra note 45 at 29, while the United Kingdom passed a measure calling
for full adjustments to exemptions. Id. at 29-30.
222 The second option, annual adjustment of this tax system by a fraction of the rise in
the selected index, has been adopted in three countries: Belgium, DeProft, Belgium: A New Pro-
gram Law, 17 EUROPEAN TAX. 330 (1977) [hereinafter cited as New Program Laud; Brazil, National
Report Brazil, supra note 145 at 281; and the Netherlands National Report: Netherlands, supra note
145, at 466. The Belgium system enacted in 1976 was targeted at taxpayers in the lowest
brackets, providing full indexation for the lowest brackets, partial indexation for the middle
brackets, and no indexation for the highest brackets. New Program Law, supra, at 330. Under the
Brazilian system, income brackets have not been fully adjusted due to the government's policies
favoring a redistribution of wealth. National Report: Brazil, supra note 145, at 281. Under the
Netherlands system, the Minister of Finance has authority to limit corrections in nominal
amounts to 80% of the change in the index, and he exercised the full extent of this authority to
adjust those amounts by that percentage in 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1975. National Report:
Netherlands, supra note 115, at 466. In one year a statute rendered the automatic correction in-
operative, and in another year a statute rendered it inoperative for higher income brackets while
correcting lower brackets by 80% of the index change. Id.
Prior to the adoption of full indexing in 1980, Israel indexed tax brackets on most occa-
sions by only a portion of the rise in the index in the years 1975-1980. While credits, tax debts
and refunds were fully and automatically adjusted, National Report: Israel, supra note 144, at
380-81, the Minister of Finance was given direction to exercise his authority to prescribe that tax
brackets be adjusted by only a pan of the increase in the cost of living index. Id. at 381. The rate
of indexing he chose to apply, 70% of the increase, corresponded to the rate of indexing of wages
under a nation-wide collective bargaining agreement and a pact between government, union,
and industry. Gubbay & Sheshinski, supra note 144, at 23-24. In 1980, these parties agreed to in-
dex wages by 80% of the increase in the price index every 3 months, and to index tax brackets at
the same intervals by 100% of the price increase. Id.
223 indexing might also be enacted as a response to imported inflation. Since im-
ported inflation causes a country to export more of its resources to pay for a constant level of im-
ports, the country either will have fewer resources left for domestic consumption, or will import
less goods from other countries. The country as a whole is therefore less well off due to imported
inflation. Where imported inflation is a significant component of a nation's overall inflation rate,
a strong argument can be made that wages should be indexed, or adjusted, only enough to offset
domestic inflation. If wages were fully adjusted to offset total inflation, either the same amount of
constant money would be left chasing a stable amount of imports and fewer domestic resources,
or fewer imports and stable domestic resources. In either event this would create a new spiral of
demand-pull inflation since the same amount of constant money would be chasing fewer goods.
If wages are only adjusted to offset domestic inflation, however, a lesser amount of constant
money would be chasing the reduced amount of goods which are available in the economy, allow-
ing prices to stabilize at a lower level. Under a partial wage adjustment, the individual wage
earner, like the country as a whole, will be less well off due to imported inflation over which
neither the country nor the worker has any control. Meanwhile, taxes are adjusted for domestic
inflation so that a constant income pays a constant tax unaffected by the domestic inflation.
Where wages are only partially adjusted, full indexation would overcompensate for inflation's
impact or wages, not merely offset it. Thus, if a country experiences imported inflation, and only
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predetermined level. 224 In indexing systems incorporating this option, the
automatic adjustment is triggered when the annual or cumulative inflation rate
reaches the particular level at which adjustments are deemed desirable. 225
When the predetermined level is reached, the system can provide for adjust-
ment based on either the most recent annual increase or the compounded
cumulative increase since the last adjustment was made. 226
The authors conclude that the third option, triggered indexing when infla-
tion exceeds a predetermined level, represents the best design for an indexing
system. This option combines the attributes of both discretionary and indexed
adjustment systems while lessening their drawbacks. Triggered indexing pro-
vides for budgetary flexibility through discretionary and targeted adjustments
at low levels of inflation, and automatic inflation offsets through adjustments
that do not require legislative action at high levels of inflation. Although less
frequent adjustments, made only when inflation is high, allow the government
to benefit more from the increase in revenues caused by inflation, the costs
resulting from annual indexing may outweigh the benefit to taxpayers in the
form of guaranteed tax reductions during periods of lower inflation."' Full, an-
nual indexing regardless of the rate of inflation is unnecessary when inflation is
partially adjusts its wages, the result may be that taxes too should only be adjusted by the same
portion of the overall index increase. Another reason for partial indexation may be the policy not
to adjust tax increases due to price increases created by the government, by increasing indirect
taxes or reducing price subsidies.
"4 This option has been adopted in France and Luxembourg. France provides for par-
tial indexing to adjust the tax structure when consumer price inflation exceeds 5% in any year.
INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 223. The French system allows different ad-
justments to be made to the various brackets, and as a result greater adjustments were made to
lower brackets than to upper brackets. Id. In 1973, the average increase in the nominal limits of
the income tax brackets was 6.5% when the index rose 7.3%, in 1974 the average bracket in-
crease was 12% when the index rose 13.7%, and in 1975 the average bracket increase was 10%
when the index rose 11.8%. Oliveau, 1977 Tax Council Report: France, 17. EUROPEAN TAX. 336,
337 (1977). In 1976, the nominal limits of all brackets were adjusted upwards between 10.36%
and 11.03%, while in 1977 the four lowest brackets, rates 0-15%, were increased an average of
9.3%, the five middle brackets, 20-40%, were increased an average of 4.0%, and the three
highest brackets, 45-60%, were decreased an average of 1.4%., Van Waardenberg, France, The
1977 Finance Bill, 17 EUROPEAN TAX. 184, 195 (1977). For 1978 income, nominal limits of the
lowest brackets were increased an average of 7.6%, the middle brackets an average of 7.9%, and
the highest brackets were decreased an average of 3.7%; while a 10% increase was made in the
level of those exempt from taxation, and in old age or invalid deductions. Van Waardenberg,
France: Finance Bill 1980 19 EUROPEAN TAX. 310, 316-17 (1979). Finally for 1979 income,
"tapering" relief continued, with the top brackets not experiencing any increase, while a 10%
increase was provided for the 0% tax bracket. Van Waardenberg, France: Finance Law 1980, 20
EUROPEAN TAX. 113, 119 (1980).
Luxembourg has also provided for indexing of the tax structure when inflation reaches a
certain level. Where cumulative, weighted CPI increases more than 5% over the last tax adjust-
ment, the tax rate is adjusted based on the index. INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note
30, at 223. Although discretion as to the adjustment is allowed, since 1968 Luxembourg has
made the adjustments strictly in line with the price index increases. Id.
225 CBO STUDY, Supra note 15, at 39-40.
226 Id.
2" Id. at 39.
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low. 229 In addition, because it automatically offsets the entire revenue increase
due to inflation, full indexing leaves no room for discretionary budgetary ac-
tion to provide targeted incentives for curbing inflation. 229 Fractional indexing
might be more effective in providing business and labor with incentives to curb
inflation. 2 " Such a system, however, would require additional legislative ac-
tion to offset the full effects of inflation. Especially at high levels of inflation,
therefore, it could be less effective than full indexing in preventing further wage
• and price escalation."' A system designed to trigger full indexing only when
inflation reaches a predetermined level allows the legislature to retain full flex-
ibility to manage or target economic policy with discretionary actions so long as
inflation remains low. This retained flexibility provides an incentive for the
government to keep inflation below the trigger level. If inflation exceeds this
level, this budgetary flexibility will be eliminated because the automatic adjust-
ment will offset the full increase in revenue due to inflation, leaving the govern-
ment with no room for discretionary action in the absence of budget reductions
elsewhere.
Although an examination of academic and practical experience with in-
dexing suggests no clear-cut choice for the correct trigger level, it is suggested
that 8% annual inflation would be an appropriate trigger level. On the one
hand, domestic 232 and foreign experience 233 indicate that indexing is not
necessary where the inflation level is below 5%. Both stabilization and ad-
ministrative cost arguments weigh against indexing when inflation is below this
level. The benefit of the automatic stabilization effect present under an unad-
justed progressive tax system in times of demand-pull inflation outweighs the
detriment of concealed progression to the tax structure. In addition, ad-
ministrative costs of implementing indexing at such a low level of inflation
outweigh the benefits of indexing. Where inflation remains below 5%, periodic
ad hoc adjustments are adequate to offset inflation impact on taxation. On the
other hand, commentators 234 and foreign experience"' indicate that indexing
is necessary where the inflation level is in double, and certainly in triple, digits.
At high levels of inflation, the detriment of concealed progression becomes in-
tolerable and benefits of indexing outweigh any administrative costs involved.
Between 5% inflation and double digit inflation, however, a gray area ex-
ists where it is unclear exactly when indexing becomes desirable. Although any
228 See Sunley, supra note 10, at 332.
229 See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 42.
238
2" Id.
232 See infra notes 278-318 and accompanying text. See text and notes at notes 278-313 in-
fra (Discretionary adjustments have been sufficient to offset the levels of inflation experienced
from 1964 through 1978. See Appendix A.).
233
	 supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
231
	 supra note 10, at 332.
233
	 supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (experience of Argentina, Brazil and
Israel).
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such choice is somewhat arbitrary, it is concluded that an 8 percent trigger will
allow the maximum discretionary budget flexibility and incentive to keep infla-
tion to an acceptable level while allowing the maximum benefit from automatic
adjustments when inflation is high. To insure the maximum inflation-offset
benefit from indexing, once indexing is triggered by annual inflation of 8% or
more, automatic adjustments should offset the cumulative effect of inflation.
These adjustments can either be determined from the last automatic adjust-
ment, or from enactment of the triggered provision. To achieve this, the
selected components of the tax system would be adjusted upward by an amount
equal to the full cumulative change in the index over this period decreased by
the cumulative effect of any discretionary adjustments made to these com-
ponents in the interim. Thus, the automatic adjustment will offset the impact
of any inflation not already offset by discretionary adjustments during years in
which inflation is less than 8 percent.
4. Timing Considerations in an Indexing System
Various timing factors must be considered in designing an indexing
system. The first decision to be made is how often to adjust taxes to reflect in-
flation. The second is what time lag there will be between the end of the index-
ing period and application of the adjustment. So long as inflation is relatively
low, annual inflation adjustments are sufficient. At high rates of inflation,
however, more frequent adjustments may be required. 236 If the tax system
operates on an annual basis, so long as inflation is not too high, it is most prac-
tical to adjust taxes annually and to base this adjustment on an annual index
increase. 237
Even if the decision is reached to make automatic annual adjustments, the
time lag between the applicable index rise and making the adjustment remains
to be addressed. Especially when inflation is high, or volatile, the greater the
lag, the greater will be the amount of discrepancy between the inflation for
which taxes are being adjusted and current inflation.'" A lag can make the in-
dex increase used irrelevant since the index will measure past, not present, in-
flation. 239 Also, any past increase will, in the meantime, be compounded. On
the one hand, when inflation is increasing the adjustment based on past infla-
tion will not offset this compounding. The government will benefit from higher
tax revenues due to inflation that is not yet offset for the duration of the time
lag. This benefit during the lag, similar to that which exists in the absence of
indexing, diminishes any incentive for the government to pursue anti-
inflationary policy. If inflation decreases, on the other hand, the adjustment
938 See, e.g., Rafael, supra note 67, at 199-200 (Israel's 1975 provision for biannual ad-
justments where inflation exceeds 10%); Gubbay & Sheshinski, supra note 144, at 24 (Israel's
1980 provision for adjustments every 3 months enacted in a three digit inflation environment).
2" See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 34.
898 See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 244.
239 See id.
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may more than compensate for any compounding of the inflation rate. Such an
overcompensation will decrease tax revenues, or, by more than offsetting cur-
rent inflation's impact on the tax system, allow them to increase less than that
occasioned by real growth. The shorter the lag between inflation-measurement
and the resulting adjustment, the less compounding of inflation will take place.
Thus, the shortest possible lag will minimize the benefit to government of
higher taxes during periods of increasing inflation and the overcompensation
for current inflation during periods of decreasing inflation. Assuming
therefore, that a country has decided to automatically adjust taxes to offset in-
flation's actual impact on the targeted component of income, the longer the
lag, the less effectively the indexing system will accomplish this goal. Countries
that implemented indexing, in some instances, have experienced lags of up to
nine months from the end of the period to which the change refers to the begin-
ning of the relevant tax period to which the adjustments are actually applied.'"
Lags of three months before the beginning of the tax period to which the ad-
justments will be applied are common.2'
Such long lag times are unnecessary .242 Proponents of time lags claim that
such lags are due to the necessity of having tables available for withholding and
declaration of estimated tax purposes before the tax period begins.'" Any prac-
tical advantages of preparing final withholding tables ahead of time is
outweighed by the disadvantages of using an outdated, irrelevant index change
as the basis of an adjustment. If a goal, therefore, is to offset the actual current
impact of inflation, the time lag should be kept to a minimum. Forecasts on the
most recent monthly index could be used for withholding and estimation pur-
poses, and the figures used could be updated during the tax year.'" A similar
use of such updating already has been implemented in the United States in the
case of tax rate changes.'" Practical administrative considerations seem to dic-
tate that the annual index period used for determining the adjustment end at
the latest possible point in the tax period which would allow tax filing forms to
be printed and distributed to individuals at the close of the tax year, as is cur-
rently the practice.2"
24° For example, this phenomenon was true in Denmark in 1975. INFLATION AND THE
INCOME, TAX, supra note 30, at 244.
241 For example, such lags exist in Canada. Id. This is also the case under ERTA. See in-
fra notes 373-74, and accompanying text.
242 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 244-45.
243 Id. at 215.
244 Id.
244 Id.
246 An alternative, the deflated income method, is theoretically superior to the method
described in the text. See id. This deflation method would allow all nominal amounts appearing
on the tax form that are to be indexed to appear in base-year dollars. The taxpayers would be re-
quired to deflate their adjusted gross income to the base period and compute their tax liability in
base year amounts, then multiply this amount by the index increase since the base year to deter-
mine liability in current dollars. Use of this deflation method would allow the appropriate index
figure to reflect inflation over most or all of the tax year, providing for announcement of the in-
dex figure at the end of the year or a later date that would fall before the date or required tax flu-
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In summary, once a decision has been made to implement a system pro-
viding for automatic indexed adjustments to offset the effects of inflation on
selected components of the tax system, several key factors in the design of such
a system must be considered. These design factors include the number and
type of indexes on which to base an adjustment, as well as the size and timing
of the appropriate adjustment. Factors in the design of an indexing system are
primarily technical or administrative in nature. Thus, assuming a political
decision to offset inflation's impact by indexing is made, choice of the ap-
propriate system design can determine how effectively and efficiently this ob-
jective is reached. Upon an analysis of the design factors, it is suggested that an
appropriate indexing system would: use a single index that measures national
income; trigger full automatic adjustments only when annual inflation reaches
a given level; and keep time lags between the measurement of inflation and the
corresponding adjustment to an absolute minimum.
Over the period from 1978 to 1980, several states enacted some form of in-
dexing to adjust state income taxes for the effects of inflation. These states
adopted a wide variety of indexing systems, an examination of which provides
background for analyzing the federal indexing decision. Since many states
allow a deduction for federal income tax liability, an inflation adjustment at the
federal level could automatically effect taxable state income for persons living
in these states.
II. STATE TAX INDEXING
By 1981 nine of the forty-four states with personal income taxes already
had some formal indexing provision and six more were considering
indexing. 247 The states which have adopted indexing, and the year in which it
was adopted, are as follows: Arizona (1978), California (1978), Colorado
(1978), Iowa (1979), Montana (1980), Oregon (1979), South Carolina (1980),
and Wisconsin (1979). 248 No two of these state indexing provisions are alike.'"
All of the states index various elements of the tax structure. While five
states index both tax brackets and exemptions or deductions,'" two states in-
dex tax brackets alone, 281 and two states index only exemptions or
ing. This method would greatly shorten or eliminate the time lag between the index period and
application of the adjustments. While the deflation method conceptually would be the best way to
eliminate any time lag, it is not a realistic option for designing an indexing system to be used by
individual taxpayers due to the extensive calculation required to be carried out by the taxpayer.
See id. at 263 (comments by A. Blinder) ("administrative considerations dictate that the Internal
Revenue Service do the deflating").
24 ' Washington Post, July 12, 1981, at 68.
249 Shannon & Lucke, State Experimentation with Indexed Income Taxes — Early Results, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE 143, 143 (Nat. Tax Assoc. — Tax
Inst. of America 1980).
249 McHugh, Income Tax Indexation in the States: A Quantitative Appraisal of Partial Indexation,
34 NAT. TAX J. 193, 193 (1981).
250 California, Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, South Carolina. Shannon & Lucke,
supra note 248, at 152.
251 Iowa, Wisconsin. Id.
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deductions. 2 " Five states chose a local metropolitan CPI-U as the relevant in-
dex, 253 and two states chose the national CPI-U as the relevant index, 2" one
state chose the GNP deflator as the relevant index, 255 and one state sets the an-
nual index based on various price data. 256 In addition, four states adjust for the
full rise in the relevant index,'" two states adjust for the full rise so long as it
does not exceed a maximum amount, 2 " two states adjust for a fixed percentage
of the full rise, 259 and one state adjusts for the full rise in excess of 3 % . 260
Beyond comparing state indexing provisions, consideration of state tax
systems is necessitated in any thorough examination of the impact of federal
inflation-adjustments because of another very important reason. There is a
significant inter-relation between the federal tax system and the state tax
system. First, some states allow full deduction of federal income taxes from
state taxable income. 261 Second, most states calculate some of their own income
taxes based on the federal tax structure."' For states included in either of these
categories, an inflation adjustment to the federal tax system could have an im-
pact on state tax collection. 263
In states allowing full deduction of federal income taxes, the more-than-
proportionate rise in federal taxes due to inflation produces a powerful restraint
on inflation-induced increases in state taxes. 265 Regardless of whether the state
tax is indexed, state tax systems are always less sensitive to inflation where
federal taxes are deductible. 265 This deduction restrains inflation-induced
growth in state tax liabilities. 266 Due to this effect, under a non-indexed federal
tax system, a full and complete state indexation plan could render such state's
income tax inelastic with respect to inflation.'" State taxes could automatically
decrease with a rise in inflation in such a system. Further, if the federal govern-
ment indexed the federal income tax system to offset the effects of inflation the
sensitivity of state income taxes to inflation will increase when the federal taxes
are deductible. 268 Thus, the restraining effect of the state's deduction upon in-
252
	
Oregon. Id.
255
	
California, Minnesota, Oregon, South Carolina. Id.
254 Montana, Wisconsin. Id.
255 Iowa (used national CPI one year, did not put indexation with GNP deflator into ef-
fect due to not maintaining required minimum amount in general fund). Id. at 146, 152.
256 Colorado. Id. at 152.
257
	
Colorado, Montana, Oregon. Id.
258 South Carolina (6%), Wisconsin (10%). Id.
257 Iowa (50%), Minnesota (85%). Id.
260 California. Id.
26! McHugh, supra note 249, at 194, 200.
262 N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1981 at Al.
265
	
State tax is based on federal adjusted gross income and federal indexing applies on-
ly to brackets, exemptions, and zero bracket amount State tax collection will not be affected.
264 McHugh, supra note 249, at 194.
265 Id. at 201.
266 Id. at 202 .
267 Id.
268 Id.
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flation distortions of its own income tax will lessen. 269 In states allowing deduc-
tion of federal tax payments, federal indexing will reduce these deductions,
resulting in higher revenue collection."' These states may be pressured to
enact their own inflation-adjustments, such as indexing, to slow the rise in tax
rates induced solely by inflation. 2"
Approximately forty states calculate either corporate or personal income
taxes based on federal rates, deductions, depreciation, or exemptions. 272 A pro-
vision for inflation adjustments at the federal level could automatically result in
less state revenue being collected in these states if state taxes would also be
automatically reduced.'" Any decision to automatically inflation-adjust the
federal tax structure, therefore, could precipitate a rash of state tax changes to
avoid this potential loss of state revenue."'
Before analyzing the inflation adjustments provided by ERTA, previous
American federal tax adjustments which have had the consequence of offsetting
inflation will be examined in Section III. These pre-ERTA adjustments il-
lustrate how the government used discretionary tax adjustments in the past to
counter inflation's impact on individuals and businesses. Social security taxes
provide an example both of what limited federal experience with indexing ex-
isted prior to ERTA and of how discretionary adjustment to offset inflation's
impact, for all practical purposes from the standpoint of the taxpayer, can be
countered by increases in another tax levied on income but labeled something
other than the income tax. Although some of these actions relative to federal
taxes were motivated by inflation, many of them were not enacted explicitly in
response to inflation. All of the actions, however, have had a de facto effect on
the overall tax system, federal income and social security as well as state taxa-
tion, vis-a-vis inflation. The examination of whether the impact of inflation on
taxes levied upon incomes has been offset in the past provides a background for
analyzing how it could be offset in the future, and whether this will be ac-
complished by ERTA's provisions.
III. AD Hoc ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TAX SYSTEM
AS AN INFLATION OFFSET: 1969-1980
Although perhaps not readily apparent to the American public, ad hoc,
discretionary changes to the federal income tax laws made from 1969 through
1978 had the aggregate consequence of overcompensating for the effect of infla-
tion upon the individual income tax during the 1960's and 1970's. 2" The im-
269 See Id.
270 See CEO STUDY, supra note 15, at 63.
2" McHugh, supra note 249, at 202. If federal indexing restricts the further growth of
federal spending, however, the responsibility for certain social programs may be transferred to
the states. CEO STUDY, supra note 15, at 63. States may then be worse off under federal indexing
because of these additional expenditures. Id.
272 N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1981, at Al.
273 Id.
224 See id.
229 Sunley, supra note 10, at 329.
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pact of inflation on federal individual income taxation was offset in the ag-
gregate by reductions in. tax rates, coupled with increases in exemptions and
tax bracket widths. Over the same time period, businesses benefitted from a
cluster of ad hoc changes in the tax laws which had the aggregate effect of
lessening but not offsetting inflation's impact on business taxation. In 1978, an
increase in the capital gains exclusion also lessened the adverse effects of infla-
tion on capital gains income received by both individuals and businesses.
While these discretionary adjustments in the federal income tax laws
lessened inflation's effect on income taxes, during the same period Congress
automatically indexed both social security benefits and the level of wages sub-
ject to social security taxes."' In addition it also repeatedly raised the social
security tax rate between 1969 and 1980.2" Thus, Social Security cannot be
disregarded in any thorough examination of the interrelation between inflation
and taxation in the United States.
A. Federal Individual Income Tax Adjustments
Discretionary federal income tax cuts and increases in both personal ex-
emptions and deductions offset the aggregate impact of the inflation expe-
rienced from the mid-1960's through the early 1970's on the individual income
tax structure of the United States."" These periodic discretionary adjustments
caused effective tax rates of the Federal individual income tax to be distinctly
lower for low-income families in 1972 than at any time since 1950.27' For tax-
payers in upper brackets, however, the effect of the inflation of the late 1960's
and early 1970's had not been offset fully by 1972, with effective tax rates for
these taxpayers being higher in 1972 than in 1964-1967.280
The effect of cumulative inflation beginning in 1964 on the individual in-
come tax was not offset for low- and moderate-income families until the 1969
Tax Reform Act2" took effect in 1970.282 This act raised the levels of personal
exemptions and deductions for the first time in over twenty years.283 Provisions
in the 1969 Act and in the Revenue Act of 1971204 that had the effect of offset-
ting the effect of inflation on the individual income tax included: an increase in
the personal exemptions from $600 to $750 by 1972;285 an increase in the stand-
ard deduction from a maximum of 10% of AGI, with a $1000 limit, to a max-
276 42 U.S.C. 5 4150(1), as amended by the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-336, 5 202, 88 Stat. 406.
277 See infra note 345.
278 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 165; CB0 STUDY, supra note
15, at 14-15.
272 Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 117.
288
	 at 117-18.
280
	 L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
282 Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 122.
202
204
	
L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
285 Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 122.
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imum 15% of AGI, with a $2000 limit by 1972; 286 replacement of the
minimum standard deduction of $200, plus $100 per exemption, with the low-
income allowance that reached $1300 by 1972; 28 ' and a decrease in the max-
imum marginal tax rate on earned income from 70% to 50'70. 288 Before the
standard deduction was raised, taxpayers at higher levels of income were
somewhat less exposed to inflation than those at lower levels because itemized
deductions, primarily used by upper-bracket taxpayers, kept pace with infla-
tion.'" The increase in the standard deduction, coupled with the increase in
the personal exemptions, offset inflation's effect on taxes for lower-bracket tax-
payers. 290 The 1969 and 1971 Acts combined to total a 13 percent nominal
reduction in taxes."' Since real tax liability measured in constant dollars is in-
creased 1 percent as a consequence of 2 percent inflation, due to the 1.5
elasticity of income taxes relative to inflation, the 13 percent reduction
represents an over-compensation for inflation over the period 1969-1972. 292
Following the sharp rise in inflation after the 1973 oil crisis, the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975 293 had the effect of offsetting this renewed surge of infla-
tion. This act reduced total income tax liabilities for 1974 by $8.1 billion
through use of a rebate.'" It also reduced 1975 tax liabilities by $9.3 billion. 295
The Act included temporary tax reductions, and increased low income
allowances and the standard deductions, and also provided a per capita tax
credit. 296 This discretionary adjustment was sufficient to offset an inflation rate
of 12 percent per year, more than offsetting the inflation actually experienced
in 1974-1975. 29 ' It also compensated for most of the effects of the inflation ex-
perienced in 1973. 298
The tax reductions, however, were not targeted to differing taxpayer
groups in proportion to the impact of inflation on each groups' tax liabilities. 299
Under the 1975 Act, $1 billion of the reduction was allocated to individuals not
paying tax at all, and the bulk of reductions were allocated to individuals whose
AGI fell below $20,000. 300 Although, across-the-board elimination of infla-
286 Id.
282 Id.
288 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 117, at 25.
288 Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 123-24.
290 See id.
281 Note, Inflation and Me Federal Income Tax, 82 YALE L.J. 716, 735 n.95 (1973).
292 Because of the 1.5 elasticity factor, the 13% reduction would offset the effect of 26%
inflation (an increase of 39% in tax liability). See Appendix A (Cumulative Inflation for 1969-72
totaled approximately 15%).
2" Pub. L. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975).
294 Kelley, supra note 13, at 19.
298 Id.
296
	 Supplement, supra note 121, at 3.
284 Kelley, supra note 13, at 19.
298 Inflation in 1973 totaled 5.7% using the GNP deflator, or 6.3% using the CPI; in
1974 8.7% using the GNP deflator, or 11.0% using the CPI; and in 1975 9.3% using the GNP
deflator, or 9.1% using the CPI. See infra Appendix A.
299 Kelley, supra note 13, at 19.
100 Id.
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tionary bracket distortions would have resulted in allocating 43% of the total
tax reduction provided in the 1975 Act to individual taxpayers whose AGI ex-
ceeded $20,000, in fact, only 15 percent of the total reductions provided in that
Act went to this group.'°' Thus, over the period from 1960 through 1975, the
discretionary tax cuts resulted in a much different distribution of tax reduction
than would have occurred under an attempt to offset the impact of inflation on
the tax system through use of an indexed system automatically linked to some
measure of inflation. 3" Discretionary tax cuts were larger for low-income
classes, and smaller for high-income classes than those which would have
resulted from an indexed system designed solely to offset the effects of inflation
upon the tax system."'
Similar discretionary action to that adopted in the Tax Reduction Act of
1975, targeted disproportionately to lower-bracket taxpayers, was enacted by
Congress from 1975 through 1977. The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 3" ex-
tended the time period covered by the temporary tax reductions of the 1975
Tax Reduction Act to July 1976. 303 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 306 further ex-
tended them through 1977. 3 ° 7 The 1976 Act also made the 1975 increases in the
low-income allowance and the percentage standard deduction permanent
features of the tax laws. 308 The Tax Reduction arid Simplification Act of
1977 3" established in place of the standard deduction the Zero Bracket
Amount of $3200 for married taxpayers filing joint returns, and $2200 for
single taxpayers."° The 1977 Act also extended the tax reductions begun in
1975 through 1978. 3 "
Although continuing the trend of targeting tax benefits to low-income tax-
payers, the Revenue Act of 1978 37 also helped higher-bracket taxpayers to a
greater extent than had previous legislation in this period. While increasing the
Zero Bracket Amount by 6.2% and personal exemptions by 25%, the 1978 Act
widened tax brackets and reduced rates in some brackets beginning in 1979." 3
°' Id. As Kelley stated:
Although the effect of inflation on a progressive tax system is to increase pro-
gressivity without legislative amendments, the effect of the disproportionate
distribution of so-called inflationary tax relief exemplified by the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975 is to increase further the progressivity of the tax System by over-
compensating lower income groups and undercompensating higher income
groups.
Id.
3°2 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 165.
3°' Id. at 165.
3°4 Pub. L. 94-164, 89 Stat. 970 (1975).
3°5 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 121, at 4.
306 Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
307 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 121, at 4.
306 Id.
309 Pub. L. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126 (1977).
"° 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 121, at 5.
"' Id.
314 Pub. L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
913 See 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 121, at 6.
1302 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:1257
The 1978 Act only offset the effects of inflation on income taxes prior to and in-
cluding 1978 for all individual taxpayers in the aggregate. In 1979, however,
large increases in oil prices renewed in spiral of inflation resulting in levels even
higher than those experienced earlier in the 1970's. Between enactment of the
1978 Act and enactment of ERTA in 1981, Congress made no further discre-
tionary adjustments which would have had the effect of offsetting inflation's ef-
fect on individual income taxes.
In the 1960's and 1970's discretionary tax cuts in the United States more
than offset inflation-induced increases in aggregate effective rates of the in-
dividual income tax. 3" Although this was true, considering all income groups
together, higher-bracket taxpayers were under-compensated for inflation's ef-
fects and lower-bracket taxpayers were over-compensated.
In addition to inflation-induced rises, growth in real per capita income
also causes increased tax liabilities as a result of the progressive tax rates.s's If
unchecked, from 1960 through 1975, the combined effect of inflation and real
growth would have increased individual income tax liabilities from 10.7 per-
cent to 16.2 percent of adjusted personal income, with real growth accounting
for an increase from 10.7 percent to 12.2 percent. 316 After the discretionary tax
adjustments discussed above, plus the 1964 tax cut, 31 ' personal income tax
liabilities had risen during this period only to 11.3 percent of adjusted personal
income in 1975. This, in fact, is less than the gain occasioned by real growth
alone . 3 ' 8
From 1951 through the 1970's, the overall effective federal individual in-
come tax rate varied between a low of 9.2 percent, in 1964, and a high of 12.1
percent, in 1969. 319 Prior to passage of ERTA, however, the effective rate for
1981 was projected to be a new high, just over 12.1 percents"
B. Business Income Tax Adjustments
The adjustments to the individual income tax were paralleled by a cluster
of discretionary adjustments affecting business ordinary income taxation which
were enacted in the 1970's. The primary adjustments to the treatment of
business ordinary income over this period included various new forms of ac-
'" INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 165; see Sunley, supra note 10, at
329.
95 Sunley, supra note 10, at 328.
3 " INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 21. Adjusted personal income
equals personal income less transfer payments and other labor income, plus employee contribu-
tions for social insurance. Id. at 159 (table 5-3, note a).
317 Revenue Act of 1964, P.L. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964). This act reduced individual
income tax rates from a range of 20-91% to a range of 14-70%. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
supra note 117, at 23.
3" INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 21.
3" Steuerle & Hartzmark, Individual Income Taxation 1947-79, 34 NAT. TAX J. 145
(1981).
520
 Id. at 145, 157.
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celerated depreciation allowances, investment credit provisions, and reduc-
tions in the corporate tak rate. The objective of these changes was to encourage
capital investment. Although their purpose was not to offset inflation, one of
their consequences, was to partially do so. Thus, to assess the overall success of
offsetting inflation's impact on the federal tax system, the inflation-offset effect
of these changes must be examined.
The Revenue Act of 1971,32' by adopting the Asset Depreciation Range
System,322 created a new type of accelerated depreciation. The Act also
reinstated a 7 percent investment credits" The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 in-
creased the investment credit, temporarily reduced corporate tax rates, and in-
creased the corporate surtax exemption.'" The reduction in tax rates and the
surtax exemption were extended through 1977 by the Tax Reform Act of
1976.225 The Revenue Act of 1978326 provided a permanent reduction in the
maximum corporate rate from 48% to 46% and instituted graduated rates for
the first $100,000 of corporate income.327 The 1978 Act also expanded the in-
vestment credit provisions.328
Although these reforms reduced the tax burden, thereby lessening inflation's
impact upon business income, they did not offset the most substantial effect of
inflation on American taxation in the 1970's. This effect was the extra tax paid
by business because of the overstatement of corporate profits in an era of infla-
tion.322 This over-statement was caused by the reliance of tax accounting upon
traditional historical-cost based accounting principles."° One study showed
that in 1977 mismeasurement of depreciation and inventories due to tax
accounting's use of historical cost data resulted in a $32 billion increase in
business income tax liability."' This figure represents an increase of 50% in
total tax paid on corporate source income over the amount of tax liability com-
puted using current cost data.'" Due to inflation, the 1977 effective tax rate on
real corporate income was calculated to be as high as 66% .333 Thus, while the
cluster of adjustments to business income taxation resulted in a tax burden less
than that which would have been imputed in their absence, they represented
nowhere near a full offset of inflation's impact upon business income.
321 Pub. L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
122 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 117, at 26-27, 403-06.
323 Id. at 27.
224
	 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 121, at 3.
325 Id. at 4-5.
326 Pub. L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
327
	
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 121 at 6.
325 Id.
323 Feldstein, supra note 118, at 348.
See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
33'
	 Feldstein, note 118 supra, at 348 (This study ignored debt.).
"2 Id.
Id. (effective tax rate on total real or inflation-adjusted, capital income of the non-
financial corporate sector, representing taxes paid by corporations, their Shareholders and their
creditors). But see Graville, Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector: A Com-
ment, 33 NAT. TAX. J. 473, 482 (1980) (1977 effective corporate tax rate calculated to be 54%).
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C. Capital Gains Tax Adjustments
Congress also reduced the tax burden on capital gains in the Revenue Act
of 1978. This reduction had the consequence of partially reducing the impact of
inflation on capital gains income. The Act increased the capital gains exclusion
from 50% to 60% ." 4 Although tax rates on capital gains appeared to be
relatively low when gains were calculated using traditional nominal cost ac-
counting methods, the tax rate on real gain, as opposed to fictitious, inflation-
induced gain, was much higher throughout the 1970's. 335 The actual tax rate
on real gain in some cases exceeded 100% due to the impact of inflation on the
measurement of the asset's basis. 336 Analysis of a 1973 IRS sample of 30,000
individual taxpayers who reported $4.6 billion in capital gains on the sale of
stock revealed that once historical purchase prices were adjusted for inflation,
this "gain" was revealed to be an actual loss of almost $1 billion."' In the ag-
gregate, therefore, these taxpayers who paid tax on a "gain" actually suffered
a constant dollar loss after adjustments are made for the impact of inflation
upon the assets they sold. 338 The increase in the capital gains exclusion,
thereby reducing the capital gains tax rate, did not change the fact that taxes
are being paid on fictitious gains induced by inflation. 3 " Even where real losses
are incurred, taxes are still levied on nominal gains, albeit at a lesser tax rate.
Although not passed by the Senate, in 1978, the House approved a measure to
index the bases of certain capital assets to offset the impact of inflation on them
so that gain attributable to inflation would not be taxed. 3 " Such a measure
would be required in order to eliminate the impact of inflation upon capital
gains income."'
D. Social Security Tax and Benefit Adjustments
Although the federal individual income tax was being adjusted to offset in-
flation with some success, Congress increased social security taxes throughout
the 1970's. The social security tax is an increasing portion of the Federal tax
burden. Hence, any analysis of the effects of inflation on the Federal tax system
should include a consideration of the role played by social security in the
federal tax scheme. In theory a large part of the social security "tax", paid by
employees and employers in equal amounts, is a fee for future benefits; that is a
payment for an annuity. In practice, however, the wage earner is likely to view
the entire amount withheld from his paycheck for social security as a tax,
334 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 121, at 6.
335 See Feldstein, supra note 118, at 347.
336 See id. at 347-48.
a" Id. at 348.
a" Id. While individuals at all income levels paid taxes on these fictitious gains, analysis
showed that the problem was most severe for individuals with incomes of less than $100,000. Id.
339 Id
3" H. REP. NO. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1978); 1979 SUPPLEMENT, supra note
295, at 16.
3" See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
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similar to income tax withholdings. A corresponding increase in either
withholding category will result in equal reduction in take-home pay. Thus, a
decrease in the federal income tax is unlikely to be perceived as either a tax cut
or an inflation adjustment if it is offset by an increase in social security taxa-
tion. 342
Although the individual income tax is progressive, social security taxes are
regressive. Under a flat rate, the social security tax is applicable only up to a set
maximum wage base."' Due to the flat rate, social security taxes are not
susceptible to either the effective-rate creep, or concealed progression, that in-
flation induces, given a progressive tax. 344 The social security tax increased
from 4.8% on the first $7800 of wages in 1969, to 6.65% on the first $29,700 in
1981 345 The maximum wage base subject to social security taxation has been
fully indexed to increase this amount by the rate of inflation since 1974 and
social security benefits have been indexed since 1975. 348 The index used is the
CPI-U. 347 By indexing the wage base subject to social security taxes, Congress
insured the value of social security receipts would not be eroded by inflation. In
addition, discretionary increases in the wage base occurred for 1979-1981. 348
342 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1972, at 36, col.2 (President Nixon's proclaimed shift in
fiscal philosophy to decrease the "bite" of the federal income tax has been relatively unnoticed
and one explanation was that for many lower and middle income workers, payroll taxes for social
security, as well as state and local taxes, climbed faster than the federal income taxes came
down.). See also infra note 349.
" 3 T.R. DYE, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY 119 (3d ed. 1978) (The social security
tax is highly regressive. It takes a much larger share of the income from the poor than the rich.).
3" See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
945 	 SOCIAL SECURITY EMPLOYEE TAXES AS
A PERCENT OF GROSS WAGES UP TO THE MAXIMUM
TAXABLE EARNING BASE, SELECTED YEARS*
YEAR WAGE BASE TAX RATE' YEAR 	 WAGE BASE TAX RATEa
1937 	 $ 3000 1.0% 1973 	 $10800 5.85%
1940 	 3000 1.0 1974 	 13200 5.85
1945 	 3000 1.0 1975 	 14100 5.85
1950 	 3000 1.5 1976 	 15300 5.85
1955 	 4200 2.0 1977 	 16500 5.85
1960 	 4800 3.0 1978 	 17700 6.05
1965 	 4800 3.625 1979 	 22900 6.13
1970 	 7800 4.8 1980 	 25900 6.13
1971 	 9000 5.2 1981 	 29700 6.65
1972 
	
10800 5.2 1982 	 32400 6.7
a For the old age and survivors insurance (OASI), disability insurance (DI), and
hospital insurance (HI) programs combined.
NOTE: DI taxes began in 1957 and HI taxes began in 1966.
" Sources: 44 Social Security Bulletin 30, 30-31 (July 1981); Samuelson, Benefit Pro-
grams for the Elderly — Of Limits to Federal Budget Cutters?, NATIONAL J. 1757, 1761 (Oct. 3, 1981)
(insert from Policymaking for Social Security (Brookings Institution 1979)).
346 Samuelson, Bentit Programs for the Elderly — Of Limits to Federal Budget Cutters?, NAT.
J. 1757, 1761 (Oct. 3, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Benefit Programs].
342 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 140, at 501.
348 See Benefit Programs, supra note 346, at 1761.
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Both the income and the social security tax are levied on wage, or earned,
income. Legislated increases in the social security tax rate effectively can offset
any inflation adjustments made to the income tax. While the taxpayer will be
better off with the inflation adjustments than without them, the net effect of the
social security tax increases and the adjustments will result in little or no in-
crease in nominal dollars retained once overall federal tax liability is paid. 3 •9 In
an era of inflation, this outcome is equivalent to a decrease in constant dollar
income retained. An increase in one federal tax rate, social security, while in-
flation adjusting another federal tax, income taxes, guarantees that the federal
government will increase its overall tax receipts in constant, inflation adjusted
dollars. Viewed in this manner, taxpayers' federal tax liabilities will not be
"inflation-adjusted" or remain the same in constant dollars; rather they will
increase in constant dollars. If the objective of adjusting for inflation is to main-
tain a stable effective tax rate on a constant dollar amount regardless of infla-
tion, increases in social security taxes will raise the overall effective tax rate just
as increases in income taxes will do the same. Although Congress overcompen-
sated for inflation in the aggregate when only the ad hoc adjustments to the in-
dividual income taxes are considered, inclusion of social security taxes made in
the past two decades in this calculation alters this conclusion. Increases in
social security taxes erased the decrease in effective tax rates caused by the in-
come tax adjustments. This was especially true at lower levels of income,
where, as noted, the income tax adjustments were targeted in the 1970's.
Overall, if social security taxes are considered together with federal individual
income taxes, the discretionary adjustments made to the latter during the
period from 1969-1980 did not offset the impact of inflation, and combined ef-
fective tax rates on individual income rose during the 1970's due to inflation.
E. Indexing Proposals
Meanwhile, throughout the mid- and- late 1970's, various individual in-
come tax indexing proposals were unsuccessfully introduced in Congress.
Among the earliest, a Senate bill entitled the "Fair Income Tax Act of
1975," 350 provided for automatic cost-of-living adjustments to tax rates, the
standard deduction, and personal exemptions. 35 ' The bill indexed these
amounts to the CPI. 352 It provided an adjustment ratio equal to the ratio that
the CPI for the preceeding calendar year bears to the CPI for the base
period. 393 This ratio was to be multiplied by the nominal amounts to be ad-
3" See Wall St. J., June 17, 1982 at 1, col. 3. (According to a Treasury Department
analysis of families of four earning between $15,000 and $40,000, the July 1, 1982 10% income
tax cut will be more than offset by inflation related "bracket-creep" and higher SociafSecurity
taxes.).
'5° S. 2737, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
"' 121 CONG. REG. 38532-33 (1975). The writers drafted the bill using estimated rates
of inflation averaging 7% from 1975 through 1985. Id. at 38532.
352 Id.
3" Id.
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justed — rates, deductions and exemptions — to determine their indexed
amounts for the current tax year.3" Senator James Buckley,3" a supporter of
the bill, stated that this bill would "result in taxing an individual's 'real' in-
come at the originally intended statutory rates" and would "remove the power
of government to profit from inflation it causes," as well as "require Congress
to show political courage to vote the tax increases required to pay for its pro-
grams' full cost, not benefiting from inflation. " 356 Later, in the 95th and 96th
Congresses, bills entitled the "Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act,"3" and "The
Taxpayer Protection Act of 1977"3" were introduced in both houses. These
provided various methods of indexing rate brackets, personal exemptions,
depreciation deductions, and basis of assets for determining gain or loss in
order to offset the effects of inflation upon these components of the tax
system.359 Section 507 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 directed the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation to make a study on simplifying and indexing the tax laws in
order to offset the impact of inflation.360 Released in April 1977, the report
acknowledged that tax inequity resulted from the interaction of inflation and
the progressive tax rates, and that a tax on net income determined under the
traditional cost accounting methods currently used in tax accounting in periods
of inflation is in reality a tax on capital."'
In summary, by 1981 the United States had experienced ad hoc, discre-
tionary inflation adjustments to the federal income tax. Although not adjusted
explicitly for inflation, changes in the rate structure, changes in business taxa-
tion and capital gain laws during this period had as one consequence a lessen-
ing of inflation's impact on the Federal tax system. Congress itself had enacted
indexing of components of the social security system coupled with increases in
social security taxes resulting in an increase in overall federal taxation. Against
this background, Congress enacted ERTA with provisions for discretionary
adjustments followed by automatic indexing adjustments to offset the impact of
inflation on the individual income tax.
IV. THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981
The effect of the rate adjustment in the Economic Recovery Tax Act362
enacted August 13, 1981, is to provide discretionary inflation adjustments to
the tax structure for the years 1981 through 1984, and automatic indexing ad-
justments beginning in 1985. The discretionary adjustments consist of across-
354 Id.
355 Conservative Republican representing New York.
356 121 CONG. REC. 38532-33 (1975).
See, e.g., H.R. 426, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1260, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); S. 1431, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
358 H.R. 1493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
359 Kelley, supra note 13, at 20. See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 79-81 (list of indexing
bills proposed in the 96th Congress).
'6° Kelley, supra note 13, at 20-21.
61 Id.
362 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
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the-board reductions of individual tax rates, rather than the reductions
targeted primarily at lower bracket taxpayers prevalent in the 1970's. This will
result in a total reduction of 23% from prevailing 1980 tax rates.'" These ac-
tual rate reductions include a rate reduction of 1.25% below 1980 figures for
1981; 10% below final 1981 rates for 1982; 10% below 1982 rates for 1983; and
5% below 1983 rates for 1984. 364 ERTA also provided for a reduction in the
highest marginal rate from 70% to 50% effective January 1, 1982. 365
In addition, ERTA provides a cluster of discretionary adjustments which
will have the effect of offsetting some of inflation's impact on other categories of
income. As a consequence of the reduction in the highest marginal rate and
other individual rates, capital gains will be taxed at the maximum rate of
20 7 366 Ordinary business income received several adjustments including a
rate reduction in the two lowest corporate tax brackets for the first-$50,000 of
income,'" the allowance of LIFO inventory valuation for small businesses,'" a
greatly accelerated depreciation method, the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS), allowing depreciation write-off of substantially all business
property in either 3, 5, 10, or 15 years, 363 and expand investment credit provi-
sions."° In addition, salability of tax benefits via safe harbor leasing"' could
dramatically reduce the effective tax rate of the business sector;
Under ERTA, beginning in 1985, the minimum and maximum dollar
amounts for each individual income tax rate bracket, the Zero Bracket
Amount, and the personal exemption will be automatically adjusted for infla-
tion by fully indexing these amounts based on the CPI-U. 32 In 1985, these
amounts will be adjusted upward based on the full percentage increase in the
363 HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC TAX ACT OF 1981 6 (1981) (P-H Report Bull. 36
Extra) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
36 '. Id. See Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 101(a), I.R.C. $ 1 (1981), amending I.R.C.
1 (1976). The 1981 reduction takes the form of a 1.25% credit against tax imposed for the calen-
dar year. Id. at 5 101(6).
363 Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 101(d), I.R.C. 5 1 (1981), amending I.R.C.' 5 1
(1976).
366 This percentage is 40% of the new top marginal rate of 50%, representing the actual
marginal tax rate on capital gains calculated after excluding 60% of any net capital gain from
gross income. See id.; I.R.C. 1202(a) (1976). This is retroactive to sales on or after June 9, 1981
— a point in time even before the top 70% rate for unearned income dropped to 50% in 1982.
Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 102; HANDBOOK, supra note 363, at 7.
369 Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 231(a), I.R.C. 5 11(b) (1981), amending I.R.C.
11(b) (1976); HANDBOOK, supra note 363, at 16.
368 Economic Recovery Tax Act 237(a), adding I.R.C. 5 474; HANDBOOK, supra note
363, at 19. See Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 235, adding I.R.C. 472 (f) (1981); id. at 5 236(a),
I.R.C. 5 472(d) (1981), amending I.R.C. 5 472(d) (1981); id. at 5 238.
368 Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 201(a), adding I.R.C. 5 168 (1981); HANDBOOK,
supra note 363, at 20-27.
378 See Economic Recovery Tax Act $S 207(c)(1), 211-14, I.R.C. 55 46-48 (1981),
amending 1.R.C. 55 46-48 (1976), 50A; HANDBOOK, supra note 363, at 33-34.
3" See Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 201, adding I.R.C. 5 168(0(8) (1981); HAND-
BOOK, Supra note 363, at 32-33.
' 72 See Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 104(a), adding I.R.C. $ 1(1) (1981); HANDBOOK,
supra note 363, at 14.
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average CPI-U for September 30, 1983 through September 30, 1984 over the
average CPI-U for September 30, 1982 through September 30, 1983. 3 '3 This
latter figure, called the CPI-U for 1983, will be the base period figure."* For
example, the 1986 adjustment will be based on the increase in the CPI-U for
1985 over this CPI-U for 1983, and so on in subsequent years.
Hailed by President Reagan as the biggest tax reduction in history, 3"
ERTA represented a dramatic shift in American tax legislation history. Con-
trary to tax reductions enacted in the late 1960's and 1970's, ERTA's discre-
tionary tax rate reductions for individual income were across-the-board cuts
rather than targeted relief. 36 As a result of the reduction in the highest
marginal tax rate from 70% to 50%, ERTA reduced, as noted, the maximum
capital gains tax rate to 20%. Businesses benefited from ERTA's greatly ac-
celerated depreciation system. Reagan claimed that "taxation of phantom cor-
porate profits ha[d] ... been significantly curtailed." 3" Finally, of course,
ERTA introduced indexing into the federal income tax system and scheduled it
to be implemented beginning in 1985. This prompted the President to state
that "[g]overnment profiteering on inflation has been abolished.... Bracket
creep will never again systematically plunder the rewards for production and
effort. Government will never again use inflation to take a rising share of the
people's income without a vote of their representatives." 3" With these
statements in mind, the effect of ERTA's provisions as inflation adjustments
will be analyzed.
V. ANALYZING ERTA's INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS
Although ERTA will offset some of inflation's impact on federal income
taxes, it will not fully neutralize inflation's effect on the Federal tax system
either before or after 1985. The provisions of ERTA that adjust for inflation,
listed in Section IV above, are, in effect, a Congressional decision to make in-
flation adjustments to the tax system. They also inherently make a decision as
to how such adjustments are to be made. At the outset, it should be recognized
that these provisions are purely adjustments to the tax structure; no ad-
justments are made to the tax base. 379 Thus, since adjustments are not made to
the tax base, it should be immediately apparent that ERTA will not fully cor-
rect any component of the tax system to offset inflation's effect. 33° In the
absence of tax base adjustments, the primary impact of inflation on business
"' See, Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 104(a), adding I.R.C. 5 1(f)(3)-(5) (1981); HAND-
BOOK, supra note 363, at 14.
"4 See Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 104(a), adding I.R.C.5 1(0(3), (4) (1981).
"3 Reagan Budget Message, supra note 7, at I.
376 See supra notes 301-03, 364 and accompanying text.
377 Reagan Budget Message, supra note 7, at 5.
"8 Id.
373 See supra notes 59, 67-71 and accompanying text.
"° See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
1310 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:1257
income and unearned income such as interest and capital gains income will re-
main unchanged under ERTA. 3"
Inflation adjustments in general, and indexing in particular, are favored
by persons desiring to halt the increasing flow to the government of tax
revenues resulting from the high elasticity of tax revenues with respect to infla-
tion."' The Reagan Administration and a more conservative Congress than
existed in the 1960's and 1970's have looked with disfavor upon an increasing
public sector and automatic tax increases. The enactment of indexing,
therefore, should not be a surprise. Furthermore, it is understandable that
automatic indexing, which results in the loss of political flexibility to re-
distribute tax reductions with each new adjustment, 383 was enacted to begin at
a point in the future. This timing allows political mileage to be gained from
discretionary action for the next three years. Yet, it does not make sense to
decide to index taxes four years in advance of the effective date of the ad-
justments when it is unknown what the rate of inflation will be at that time. Ac-
cording to administration forecasts issued in late 1981, inflation in 1985, bar-
ring unforeseen circumstances, will be only 3.7% . 384 While the Congressional
Budget Office forecasted inflation of 5.9% by 1985, 385 many private
economists regarded these forecasts as too low, and predicted inflation of at
least 6 to 8% through 1985. 386 Implementation of indexing is unnecessary at
even the highest of these levels of inflation."' Targeting indexing to begin in
1985, therefore, does not make economic sense, especially when the interven-
ing years of 1981-1984 are anticipated to be a period of higher inflation 388 and
taxes are not indexed to offset the inflation of that intervening period. The in-
dexing, assuming it is properly done, should be carried out in the earlier years
before 1985.
Considering earlier federal indexing proposals, current state indexing
systems, and the foreign indexing experience, the scope and attributes of the
indexing provisions were also predictable. Although adjustments to both the
tax structure and base are necessary to offset inflation's impact fully, foreign
and state experience with indexing indicates that legislature usually consider
indexing the tax structure independently of any provisions to take the much
more complex step of indexing the tax base.'" In addition, prior federal index-
ing proposals called for automatic adjustments to be confined to an important,
but limited, part of the nominal tax structure: rate brackets, Zero Bracket
mil See supra notes 82-120 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 42-46, 132-35 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 128-31, 136-39 and accompanying text.
38* Cowan, Inflation Estimates in Conflict, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1981, S D (Business) at 1,
col. 7.
3" Id.
386 Id.
3" See supra text accompanying notes 232-235.
388 See Cowan, supra note 384, at I.
3" See Ruppe, supra note 10, at 112.
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Amounts, and personal exemptions.39° Most other indexing provisions, both in
the states and abroad, are based on consumer price indexes and entail substan-
tial time lags.391 It is not surprising therefore that ERTA's indexing provisions
also fit this mold even though such an index is not sufficiently
comprehensive,392 and substantial time lags make the adjustment used irrele-
vant. 393
A. Deficiencies in the Discretionary Adjustments to Individual Income Taxation
Prior to the implementation of indexing, ERTA continues the historical
reliance on discretionary action to adjust individual income taxation to offset
the effects of inflation. Across-the-board tax rate reductions394 spread over four
years combined with a one time drop in the maximum tax rate for unearned in-
come, from 70% to 50%, constitute the extent of ER TA's discretionary ad-
justments to the individual income tax structure. Until the start of indexing,
scheduled for 1985, no further action is contemplated in ERTA to offset infla-
tion's impact since the last discretionary adjustment was made in 1978.395 In
analyzing the effectiveness of ERTA's discretionary adjustments, several defi-
ciencies become apparent. The rate adjustments are unlikely to offset actual in-
flation experienced from 1979 through 1984. Consequently, most nominal
amounts in the Code which are subject to erosion by inflation will continue to
have their value eroded because they are not adjusted to offset this effect of in-
flation. Due to these limitations the discretionary structural adjustments pro-
vided in ERTA are not comprehensive enough to offset effective-rate creep
caused by inflation's impact on the progressive rate structure.
First, absent additional discretionary adjustment during the period of
1981 through 1984, the inflation adjustments provided by ERTA for those
years will not offset inflation's expected impact on the rate structure since the
last discretionary adjustment was made in 1978. Although the scheduled
reductions should be sufficient to offset current inflation, unless levels of infla-
tion prove to be even lower than those forecasted by the administration for the
years 1982-1984,396 the reductions will not be sufficient to offset the compound-
ed impact of the "double-digit" inflation experienced in 1979 and 1980.'97 ER-
TA's cumulative reduction in tax rates of 23% will offset the increase in real
tax liabilities caused by compounded inflation of 46% . 398 While actual and
'9° See supra notes 350-58 and accompanying text.
39' See supra notes 193, 240-41, 253-54 and accompanying text.
392 See supra notes 185-208 and accompanying text.
393 See supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes 363-65 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 312-13, 372 and accompanying text.
398 See Cowan, supra note 384, at 1.
'91 See infra Appendix A.
398 Because of the elasticity of income tax liabilities with respect to inflation of + 1.5,
46% cumulative inflation will raise income tax liabilities by 69%. See supra notes 13, 25 and ac-
companying text. In this example only 23%, 69% minus 46%, represents the increase in real tax
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predicted inflation compounded over the period 1981 through 1984 totals only
29-33%7, 399 inflation for 1979 and 1980 alone totaled 18-26% depending on
which index is used to measure inflation. 400 After 1979-1981's compounded in-
flation level of approximately 30% measured by the GNP deflator or 39%
measured by the CPI-U is taken into account,"' the maximum compounded
inflation which could be offset by these adjustments, if the impact of inflation
since the last adjustment was made is to be offset, is 16% measured by the
GNP deflator or 7% measured by the CPI-U for the years 1982 through 1984.
Only additional adjustments, or a sudden return to inflation levels experienced
in the 1960's, will enable ERTA to offset inflation's expected effect on pro-
gressive rates through 1984. Thus, compared with his position at the beginning
of 1979, the American taxpayer will be paying higher taxes due to inflation
when indexing is scheduled to begin in 1985.
The next, and most glaring, pre-1985 deficiency in inflation adjustment of
the tax structure provided by ERTA is the failure to adjust a large number of
fixed nominal amounts in the tax structure. 402 Although adjusting the tax rates
is equivalent to adjusting the tax brackets, all other fixed amounts, including
the Zero Bracket Amount, and personal exemptions will continue to have their
value eroded by inflation prior to the beginning of indexing in 1985. The Act
provides neither discretionary nor automatic adjustments of these amounts
before 1985. Only tax rate adjustments will have the effect of offsetting infla-
tion. The extent to which simple adjustment, discretionary or indexed, of the ,
rate schedules alone would provide sufficient adjustment to offset "double-
digit" inflation experienced in 1979-1981 is questionable. 403
It has been proposed that all fixed, nominal amounts appearing in the In-
ternal Revenue Code, Regulations, and Revenue Rulings be given a "fresh
start" adjustment prior to implementation of indexing. 404 This initial adjust-
ment would increase the originally enacted nominal amount by the increase in
liabilities due to inflation, since tax liabilities that rise 46% during a period of 46% inflation
would represent the same tax liability in constant dollars before and after the inflationary period.
To maintain tax liabilities at the same constant dollar level, the elasticity of income tax liabilities
with respect to inflation must be reduced to + 1.0. In this example, a 23% reduction in tax
liabilities would be necessary to maintain tax liabilities at the same constant dollar level.
Therefore, a 23% reduction in income tax liabilities will offset the impact on income taxes of
46% cumulative inflation.
39 Projected cumulative inflation for the period 1981-84 is between 29% and 33%,
based on the range of inflation estimates in Cowan, supra note 384.
499 Calculations of cumulative inflation for the period 1979-80 range from 18% to 26%
depending on the index used to measure inflation. See infra Appendix A (18% based on the GNP
deflator, 26% based on the CPI-U).
4" See infra Appendix A.
4° 2 See C80 STUDY, supra note 15, 47-52 (Appendix A-listing of 82 nominal amounts in
the Code).
4°' Lubell & Lavin, Indexation of the Tax Laws: A "Fresh-Start" Adjustment, 58 TAXES 355,
355-56 (1980).
4°4 Id. at 356, 361. Advocates of this approach proposed that these "fresh-start" ad-
justments should be based on increase in the CPI since it would be the index which Congress
would probably use in indexing. Id.
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the applicable index from the year of original enactment to the present*" Such
an adjustment would return these nominal amounts to the real value they
represented when created by the legislature. Indexation of all nominal amounts
could then proceed and intended real values would remain unaffected by infla-
tion." 8
This "fresh-start" proposal serves to highlight a major deficiency in the
inflation adjustments to the tax structure provided by ERTA. Regardless of the
impact of ERTA's across-the-board rate reductions, the value of all other
fixed, nominal amounts in the Code will be eroded by inflation. Consequently,
even the amounts selected for subsequent indexing will represent substantially
fewer constant dollars when indexing begins than they currently represent.
Unless the selected amounts are adjusted before indexing takes effect, the ero-
sion in value occurring between 1981 and 1984, let alone that which occurred
before 1981, will not be regained under ERTA's indexing proposal. Instead,
only the eroded value of amounts selected for indexing will be protected from
further erosion by inflation under indexing.
In summary, ERTA's discretionary tax reductions will not reduce the tax-
payer's tax liabilities by enough to offset the effect of the inflation that has oc-
curred since the last discretionary tax reduction. The reductions are insuffi-
cient to neutralize the impact on taxes of the high inflation experienced in 1979
and 1980. In addition, ERTA's provisions do nothing to halt inflation's con-
tinued erosion of fixed nominal amounts in the Code. In the absence of further
adjustments, the American taxpayer will enter ERTA's indexation of in-
dividual income taxes in 1985 with higher tax liabilities, due to inflation's
effective-rate creep, than existed in the late 1970's. Furthermore, the amounts
scheduled to be indexed will have a lower real value, due to inflation's erosion,
than they did in the late 1970's or even when ERTA was enacted in 1981.
B. Deficiencies in the Indexing Provision
The indexing provision contained in ERTA was passed in the final stages
of Congressional action on the Act, with little attention paid to its design."'
The inclusion of indexing in ERTA greatly increased the complexity of a bill
the administration had originally intended to be a simple, discretionary tax
rate reduction. 408 The result was a provision that was both ill-considered and
inadequate to offset inflation's impact on the income tax structure. Most fixed
amounts were overlooked by the Act and left totally unadjusted. Congress did
not consider alternatives to the use of a single index, or to the particular single
index chosen. Nor did it consider the problems of time lag and compounding of
inflation's effect, produced by a time lag.
4° 3
"6 See id.
4" Samuelson, Sloppy Indexing, NAT. J. 1553 (Aug. 29, 1981).
408 13 TAX NOTES 237 (July 27, 1981).
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To effectively offset inflation's impact on the tax structure, comprehensive
indexing would include adjusting all nominal amounts in the Code,." after
some sort of initial "fresh-start" adjustment has been made to each amount.
Since all of the fixed-dollar amounts in the Code are not indexed, many tax-
payers can still incur higher constant dollar tax liabilities due to inflation,
because the real value of non-indexed tax provisions will decline. 1 ° For ex-
ample, the earned income credit" was not indexed by ERTA. The oversight
of the earned income credit in effect burdens those benefitted by the credit,
workers now in the $5000 to $10,000 income range, with a large tax increase,
while taxpayers in higher income ranges will be somewhat cushioned from in-
flation." Oversights such as this may be the result of the hasty consideration
the indexing provision received. This inadequate consideration was perhaps
the result of the fact that the measure would not take effect for four years, and
was added as a mere amendment to a major tax-cut bill." Indexing simply did
not receive the requisite attention given its potential impact. Congress had
available information that would have enabled it to do a more thorough job of
evaluating indexing. For instance, experience from the various state indexing
provisions already in effect, and a comprehensive Congressional Budget Office
study on indexing commissioned in 1980" could have been consulted. Instead
the issue of indexing was buried in the mass of other provisions enacted in
ERTA and in the escalating enticements offered by both political parties to
gain support for their particular tax package in the weeks prior to ERTA's
enactment.
Alternative price indexes to the CPI-U do not appear to have been seriously
considered. The objective of an inflation-neutral income tax should be to offset
all price changes reflected in an individual's income." Thus, a theoretically
better index would be some measure of GNP.'" Practically, the question might
come down to which measure actually reflects taxable income more accurately:
the CPI-U or GNP deflator. Using the GNP deflator was inadequately debated
prior to Congressional choice of the CPI-U. In fact, it appears Congress chose
the wrong index by which to adjust income taxes. An index based on a current
market-basket, and which reflects inflation's impact on all income, consump-
tion plus savings, would be more appropriate. The GNP deflator has each of
these characteristics. Congress, it follows, should have chosen a GNP deflator
rather than the CPI-U.
444 Sloppy Indexing, supra note 407, at 1553; See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 47-52.
"a CBO STUDY, Supra note 15, at 14.
+ 11 I.R.C. S 43 (1982).
412 Sloppy Indexing, supra note 407, at 1553.
" 3 Perhaps the earned income credit, essentially a welfare provision, was not indexed as
part of the overall trend toward limiting welfare programs.
414 CBO STUDY, supra note 15.
41 ' See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
416 See supra notes 185-216 and accompanying text.
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Under ERTA the CPI-U figures are subject to monthly averaging.'" In
the alternative, seasonally adjusted annual figures could have been used. The
use of monthly averaging has been described as eliminating seasonal and other
erratic changes." Despite this purported advantage, whether it was really
desirable to use the raw data inherent in monthly averaging rather than an-
nually adjusted data was never debated and considered.
The indexing enacted will entail annual adjustments for the entire rise in
inflation as measured by the CPI-U, regardless of inflation level." Although
indexing might be necessitated by "double digit" levels of inflation, most
observers would agree that it would be more of a burden than it is worth when
inflation is below 5-7 percent.'" Between these two ranges, opting for full,
automatic indexing becomes a close call. Built-in flexibility may be a better
choice where it is unclear whether inflation will drop to levels where indexation
is unnecessary or rise to levels requiring indexation. This uncertainty makes
some sort of triggered option421 preferable to ERTA 's provision, especially
since indexing will not begin until four years after its enactment.
Finally, time lags of up to 15 months, from the last date used in
calculating the applicable index to the end of the relevant tax year."'" in which
the adjustment would be made, greatly limit the effectiveness of automatic in-
dexing.'" This index adjustment might be totally irrelevant to the current rate
of inflation at the time of the adjustment."'" In addition, the effects of inflation
for which the adjustment will be made will be those of the previous year.425 Not
only, therefore, does the government benefit both from higher taxes in the in-
terim due to inflation's compounded unadjusted impact, it has a diminished in-
centive to lower inflation since it reaps automatic benefits of higher taxes due to
inflation over the long time lag. The shorter the lag, and the more current the
rate of adjustment, the less government reaps these benefits.
415 Economic Recovery Tax Act 5 104(a), adding I.R.C. 5 1(0(4) (1981). Similar
monthly averaging occurs in the Canadian indexing system. INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX,
supra note 30, at 244.
415 INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 245.
485 See Economic Recovery Tax Act S 104(a), adding I.R.C. S 1(0 (1981).
420 supra notes 224-35 and accompanying text. See also ROSENN, supra note 76, at 353.
428 See supra notes 220, 224-26 and accompanying text.
477 See Economic Recovery Tax Act S 104(a), adding I.R.C. S l(f)(3), (4) (1981).
473 For example, the lag between September 1984, when the first index averaging period
is scheduled to end, and January 1985, when the first tax period is scheduled to begin, is 3
months, while the lag between September 1984 and December 1985, when the first tax period
under indexing is scheduled to end, is 15 months. Thus, the average lag between the most recent
figures used and the period during which the adjustment is made will be 9 months.
474 While it has been contended that use of the wrong time period could be a virtue,
because it would minimize any adverse effect of automatic indexing on economic stabilization
properties of an unadjusted system, this view has been criticized in the absence of the showing of
a regular and predictable relation between a lagged price change and the unemployment rate. IN-
FLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, Supra note 30, at 245 n.20.
425 See Economic Recovery Tax Act S 104(a), adding I.R.C. S 1(0(3), (4) (1981).
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Congress did not explore all the relevant considerations involved in any
adjustment to a tax system to offset the effect of inflation in passing the infla-
tion adjustments in ERTA. In particular, Congress did not sufficiently debate
the numerous options available in designing an indexing system to fit the objec-
tive of offsetting inflation's impact on individual taxes. Due to the interrela-
tions of all aspects of the tax system, federal and state, the decision to adopt a
scientific automatic adjustment to offset inflation following years of familiarity
with ad hoc, discretionary adjustments should have received and still can
receive thorough scrutiny and be subject to comprehensive debate.
C. Overview of the American Tax System After ERTA
The post-ERTA mix of measures intended to adjust to tax for inflation
developed to a large extent accidentally. These measures are neither a consist-
ent nor a scientific attempt to neutralize the impact of inflation. The effect of
pressure groups upon national policy and the resulting enactment of specific,
ad hoc tax provisions can be discerned much more readily than can any express
intention to comprehensively offset inflation's effect on taxes. This is evident in
the areas of accelerated depreciation, energy credits and other investment
credit provisions. The question is not whether the system is defensible or
whether such ad hoc provisions should be eliminated, but rather what changes
are desirable to explicitly adjust taxes to account for inflation.
An overview of the individual tax system reveals that the rate structure
will be indexed, whereas the tax base and thus the definition of income will re-
main nominal for both ordinary and capital gains income. Due to inflation's
impact, interest income is especially overtaxed, while a reverse impact of infla-
tion on the interest deduction results in undertaxation of the borrower. 426 It is
little comfort to the individual taxpayer to learn that another is undertaxed at
the same time that he is overtaxed.
The special treatment of capital gain taxation has been supported as a
means to encourage capital investment and, to some extent, to compensate for
what otherwise would be bunching in one year of income representing nominal
appreciation in the asset's value over the entire holding period. 427 Its retention
and most recent extension, from a 50% exemption to a 60% exemption,
however, was also defended in part as an adjustment for inflation's impact on
the nominal appreciation. 428 As an inflation adjustment, this rule produces ar-
bitrary results that harshly overtax some activities while others are
subsidized . 429
The cluster of prevailing business income tax provisions prior to ERTA,
on the whole, under-compensated businesses for the impact of inflation upon
their income. The effective tax rate on real corporate income reached a level of
426 See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
427 Blinder, supra note 121, S A at 19, col. 2.
424 Id. at col. 3.
129
 Id. See also supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
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approximately 60%. 430 Ad hoc preferential treatment provisions such as ac-
celerated depreciation,"' various investment credits, 432 and the LIFO account-
ing option, 433 coupled with the failure to correct the debt liability portion of the
balance sheet, resulted in an effective tax rate that was primarily a function of
the composition of a firm's assets and liabilities. ERTA's increase in the scope
of some of these ad hoc preferences, together with saleability of depreciation
deductions and tax credits through safe harbor leasing, 494 should result in a
decrease in the effective rate of taxation business income in 1981 and subse-
quent years. So long as safe harbor leasing is allowed, this effective tax rate
essentially becomes a function of negotiated tax deals between profitable firms
and firms which otherwise would not incur sufficient tax liability to make full
use of available depreciation and credits on their assets.
An overview of the post-ERTA federal tax system indicates that govern-
ment's more than proportionate increase in revenue due solely to inflation has
not been abolished. While ERTA's reduction in this effect of inflation is not in-
significant, major areas of "profiteering on inflation" were not directly ad-
dressed in the Act. Direct action to limit this phenomenon was limited to the
area of the individual income tax structure. Although sufficient to offset
foreseeable levels of inflation over the three year period, the discretionary ad-
justments made by ERTA are insufficient to offset inflation's impact since the
last such adjustments were made in 1978. Beyond the rate structure, all other
fixed amounts in the Code will continue to have their real value eroded by in-
flation prior to indexing. Due to this erosion, enactment of an automatic an-
nual indexing provision four years before it is to take effect is irrational. Fur-
thermore, the indexing provision is hot comprehensively applied to all fixed
amounts and reflects the lack of debate and consideration which this measure
received. While ERTA's provisions decreased individual income taxes com-
pared to the level that would have existed absent the Act, social security tax in-
creases automatically took effect. Therefore, regardless of ERTA, the in-
dividual's overall tax burden will increase. 435 In the area of business income
taxation, other than the indirect impact of greatly accelerated depreciation
under ACRS, extended ad hoc provisions such as investment credit, LIFO ac-
counting and safe harbor leasing, neither direct tax structure nor tax base ad-
justments were made to offset inflation. Finally, no attention was focused upon
two major areas of government profiteering on inflation: the tax treatment of
capital gains and of interest. Adjustments that were made to the individual in-
come tax structure will do little to offset inflation's impact on individual recip-
43° Feldstein, supra note 118, at 348.
4" See supra note 322 and accompanying text; I.R.C. 167(M) (1982).
12 See supra notes 323, 328 and accompanying text; I.R.C. 55 50 (repealed 1978), 50A
(1982).
4" See supra note 85 and accompanying text; I.R.C. 5 472 (1982).
434 Economic Recovery Tax Act 201(a), adding I.R.C. 5 168(0(8); HANDBOOK, supra
note 363, at 32-33.
"' See supra note 349.
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Tents of income from these sources, and nothing to offset inflation's impact on
corporate recipients. Only adjustments to the tax base of these income areas
would neutralize inflation's effect. Thus, although explicitly addressing the ef-
fect of inflation upon taxation, ERTA did not abolish government "profiteer-
ing on inflation."
VI. PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC
RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981
A. Individual Income Tax Proposals
Four major changes to ERTA's inflation adjustments to the individual in-
come tax structure are proposed by the authors. First, automatic indexing in-
flation adjustments to the tax structure should be linked to the GNP implicit
price deflator rather than to the CPI-U. Second, the period to which the index
refers for determining the adjustment should be the twelve month period end-
ing September 30 of the current tax year. For example, the inflation adjust-
ment for the tax year 1985 would be the increase in the index as of September
30, 1985, over the base index as of September 30, 1984. Third, an immediate
"fresh-look" reconsideration should be given to all nominal, fixed amounts in
the tax structure. Fourth, indexing should be implemented immediately, but a
triggering mechanism should be designed so that indexing would go into effect
only when a particular level of inflation is reached.
The GNP implicit price deflator is preferable over the CPI-U as an index
to use for adjusting the tax structure to offset the effect of inflation. 436 An infla-
tion adjusted tax structure should tax individuals on the basis of their real in-
come, in constant dollars, regardless of consumer price changes!49 ' Increases in
prices paid by any group for goods or services will raise someone's earnings.'"
This increase in income under progressive tax rates will result in increased ef-
fective tax rates.*" Consequently, these are the prices on which an index for
adjusting a tax system should be based."° Although consumer purchases are a
major factor in this index, they represent only one portion of entire national
production which gives rise to income."' The GNP deflator is also superior to
the CPI-U since the personal consumption expenditure portion of the GNP
deflator covers all consumer purchasing, not just that done by non-farm urban
individuals used in the CPI-U. 442 Also unlike the CPI-U, the GNP deflator is a
16 See Sloppy Indexing, supra note 407, at 1553 (NI deflator should be used in place of the
CPI)
4" See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
466 The GNP deflator would take account of prices paid by business and government as
well as the private consumer. See INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 249-50 &
n.28.
4" Id.
440 See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
44' See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
442 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. For this reason, should the decision re-
main to use a consumer price index, the PCE implicit price deflator would be better than the
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current market-basket index."' This eliminates the problem with fixed weight
indexes such as the CPI-U, the tendency to overstate inflation since consump-
tion habits change over time. 44 Like the CPI-U, the GNP deflator is widely
recognized and accepted by the public. The GNP implicit price deflator, as a
more comprehensive, stable index, less subject to volatile movement," 5 is
superior to the CPI-U for indexing inflation adjustments to an income tax.
Second, the time lag between the end of the indexing period and applica-
tion of the adjustment should be minimized. Time lags of up to 15 months both
are unnecessary and make the adjustments which are applied irrelevant. 446
Forecasts based on the most recent monthly index could be used for
withholding estimation purposes. Tax filing forms could be printed and
distributed to individuals at the close of the tax year, as is currently the prac-
tice. These forms could then incorporate the most recent information from the
relevant index through September 30 of the tax year. Practical administrative
considerations require use of this method instead of the "deflation" method 447
which entails extensive calculations by the taxpayer. This change would go a
long way toward improving the effectiveness of the indexing provisions and
eliminating the time in which the tax structure would not be adjusted to offset
the effects of large increases in inflation.
Third, Congress should examine the current dollar valuations of all the
nominal amounts in the Code. Such a "fresh-look" requirement would in-
crease the effectiveness of the inflation adjustment provisions of ERTA. None
of the fixed dollar amounts in the Code have been adjusted every year, and
many amounts have not been adjUsted since adoption of the 1954 Code. In
light of both the inflation that has occurred since the last adjustment of an
amount and the presently anticipated future inflation, all fixed amounts should
be reconsidered by Congress to insure their intended value is expressed in cur-
rent dollars. Even if the nominal amounts now scheduled to be indexed were
immediately and fully adjusted to account for inflation, the effects of inflation
on the tax structure will not be completely offset so long as most nominal fixed
amounts remain unadjusted year after year." 8 ERTA, therefore, should be
amended to provide for indexing to apply to these nominal amounts in addition
to the indexation already provided in the Act. 449
CPI-U because the former is a current market basket index and is not limited to urban
households.
4" See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
" 4 See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
445 See infra Appendix A.
"6 See supra note 423.
447 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
448 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. If for some reason a fresh-look recon-
sideration is ruled out, a fresh-start adjustment should be made. See supra notes 404-06 and ac-
companying text. This fresh-start adjustment should be tied to the rise in the GNP deflator since
the amount's original enactment.
449 In the alternative, in the interest of equity, at least the earned income credit should
be included in the list of amounts to be indexed. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, ERTA should be amended to provide that no inflation ad-
justments will be made until a specified level of inflation has been reached.
Such a "trigger" provision would provide for indexing when inflation is high,
while not providing for indexing when inflation remains low. The authors pro-
pose that the trigger-level be 8% annual inflation. When annual inflation
reaches 8% for the year ending September 30 of the tax year, the tax structure
automatically would be indexed. Consequently, so long as inflation remained
below 8%, Congress would retain full flexibility to manage or target economic
policy with discretionary actions. This retained flexibility would provide an in-
centive for the government to keep inflation below 8%.4" Once the ad-
justments are triggered, the tax structure, including all fixed, nominal
amounts, should be adjusted for the entire cumulative change in the index
since the previous adjustment, or since the fresh-look readjustment. These
automatic adjustments, however, should be decreased to account for any off-
setting of inflation resulting from discretionary adjustments Congress made to
nominal Code amounts in the interim. This triggered indexing as of 1982
coupled with a fresh-look reconsideration of all fixed amounts is a better ap-
proach than the scheduled tax cuts which are to be made from 1981 through
1984. As a practical and political matter, since the Administration has an-
nounced the scope of the tax cuts prior to 1985, it may not be feasible to imple-
ment this triggered indexing before the date ERTA's original indexing provi-
sions begin. If this is the case, the tax structure should be indexed in 1985 to
offset the inflation of 1979-1984 not offset by the rate cuts.
Taken together, these four proposals could neutralize the impact of infla-
tion on the individual income tax structure, hence eliminating effective-rate
creep over time.45' To the extent that an individual's income represents earned
income, these adjustments could offset inflation's effect on his taxes. The fresh-
look readjustment would immediately revalue all fixed amounts and state them
in current dollars. Then, indexing based on the GNP deflator and a minimal
time lag would be triggered whenever annual inflation reached a level of 8%.
Although inflation would affect taxes when indexing is not triggered annually,
in the absence of discretionary adjustments, this drawback is balanced by the
budgetary flexibility accorded Congress when inflation is less than 8% coupled
with the cumulative adjustment made to offset inflation's impact during the in-
tervening years without indexing once inflation reaches 8% and indexing is
triggered.
These proposals, however, do not offset distortions of the tax base caused
by inflation thus not diminishing the effect of inflation on taxation of unearned
individual income derived from the sale of property and interest, or business
income from sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporate dividends. In
addition, ERTA's proposals do not take into account inflation's effect on
business taxation or the public's perception of social security taxes as part of
450 See generally supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
451 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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the overall tax burden. These concerns as well as capital gains, interest, and
business income treatment must be addressed if government profiteering on in-
flation truly is to be abolished.
B. Inflation-Adjusting the Entire Tax System
To effectively offset the impact of inflation on federal taxes in the United
States, the entire tax system rather than just a portion of the individual income
taxes must be adjusted. Furthermore, Congress must be aware that inflation
adjustments to the income tax system, even full, automatic indexed ad-
justments, probably will not be viewed by the public as effectively offsetting in-
flation in years when the social security tax rate is increased.'" Increases in
social security taxes may well influence the extent or timing of discretionary in-
flation adjustments undertaken alone or in addition to indexed adjustments.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to credibly portray to the public any such adjustment
as eliminating inflation's impact on taxes if social security tax rates are concur-
rently raised.
Elimination of the effect of inflation on earned income, by itself, is not
adequate to offset inflation's full effect on individual or business income taxes.
Taxation of fictitious, inflation-induced gains in unearned income must also be
addressed by comprehensive adjustments. Several steps can be undertaken to
accomplish this latter goal. The authors would replace the present system of
taxation of capital gains with a system of indexing the basis of all capital assets
and taxing only the real gain, at ordinary income rates, as well as allowing
averaging over the holding period and full loss offset against ordinary
income.'" As capital gains generally reflect income -accumulated over long
periods, such a system should be instated even if the annual rate of inflation is
relatively low. Interest income should also be indexed. The real component of
income above the rate of inflation should be taxed, and a corresponding deduc-
tion allowed. 454
Although the aforementioned reforms are crucial to a comprehensive ad-
justment for inflation, not all of the possible tax base adjustments necessarily
should be made. When addressing business income the authors do not suggest
that it generally be measured in real terms. Such a rule is exceptionally com-
plex's' and is not justified at the present rate of inflation. The authors would
not propose adopting this tax base adjustment unless inflation was substantial-
ly higher, in the range of triple-digit inflation. Short of this sort of scientific
452 See supra notes 345, 349. (Wage base indexing of social security taxes does not cause
this effect associated with rate increases because it merely insures that constant dollar tax
liabilities on the same constant dollar income remain the same. Since there is an upper limit on
wages subject to social security tax, in the absence of rate increases, constant dollar tax liabilities
on a constant dollar income level that exceeds the limit would decrease because of inflation if the
wage base limit was not indexed.).
4" See supra note 121.
454 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
425 See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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measurement of income on a real base, current policies of partial adjustment to
specific assets, or industries, through discretionary measures are inevitable, so
long as a continuing goal of national tax policy is the neutralization or allevia-
tion of inflation's impact. In determining the scope and extent of these discre-
tionary adjustments, Congress should not forget the liability side of the balance
sheet. This does not mean necessarily that adjustments should be made for the
taxation of liabilities, but in deciding how to adjust the taxation of assets, the
extent of the discretionary adjustment should be a function of the fact that
liabilities are not adjusted. This consideration should be kept in mind, for ex-
ample, if accelerated depreciation or the investment credit are extended fur-
ther. Perhaps the Administration and Congress should determine the desired
effective tax rate for corporate taxation, and then attempt to achieve it by ad-
justing the extent of the discretionary measures presently employed in light of
current inflation.
In summary, to truly abolish "government profiteering" on inflation
much more must be adjusted than the individual income tax structure adjusted
by ERTA. In addition, policymakers should recognize how the public is likely
to perceive the federal tax system — as an integrated whole. Both social securi-
ty and income taxes together constitute their federal tax burden. Where social
security rates are scheduled to be increased at or close to the time inflation ad-
justments to the individual income tax are implemented, only if adjustments go
beyond that required to offset inflation's impact on income taxes, will the ad-
justments be viewed as sufficient to offset the effect of inflation on an in-
dividual's federal tax liabilities.
To neutralize the actual effect of inflation on income taxes, the tax base as
well as the tax structure of income derived as capital gain or interest should be
adjusted scientifically. Only real gain should be required to be included in tax-
able income; similarly, only real loss should be allowed to be deducted from
taxable income. Although such adjustments would constitute major changes to
the present Code, they are both administratively feasible and desirable at cur-
rent levels of inflation. Scientific adjustment of the tax base of ordinary
business income, however, would be much more complex and would entail
tremendous problems of transitional equity for many industries if such an ad-
justment were to be attempted. 456 Such an adjustment is not warranted at cur-
rent or anticipated future levels of inflation. Discretionary measures currently
in use, such as accelerated depreciation, can and should be employed as ad-
justments to the degree necessary to achieve the specific objective of offsetting
the effects of current and anticipated future levels of inflation. These ad-
justments, when combined with the proposals to improve ERTA's individual
tax structure adjustments, can serve together as an effective offset to the actual
effects of inflation on federal income taxation.
156 See generally INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 30, at 33-60 (Chapter 2:
Tideman and Tucker, The Tar Treatment of Business Profits Under Inflationary Conditions).
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CONCLUSION
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, first by providing across-the-
board discretionary inflation adjustment and then by providing for automatic
inflation adjustment through indexing, represents a major departure from
earlier discretionary adjustments to the United States tax system. Even as a
more scientific departure from previous inflation adjustment treatment, ERTA
is still in many aspects inadequate. Most nominal fixed amounts in the tax
structure remain unaffected by the adjustment made in the Act. Discretionary
adjustments prior to 1985 are likely to be insufficient to fully offset actual infla-
tion experienced since the last income tax adjustment in 1978. Also, several
crucial considerations effecting indexation were not examined sufficiently
closely before deciding how to index the tax structure.
In conclusion, the Act represents a major change in terms of inflation ad-
justments to the tax structure. Fortunately, unlike many instances of over-
zealous and sloppy legislation, time still remains before ERTA's indexing is
scheduled to begin Ideally this will allow the Administration, Congress, and
the public a second chance to take a more comprehensive look at the options
and considerations associated with indexing and to improve the indexing provi-
sion before it is implemented. Unless this is done, the government will con-
tinue to profiteer on inflation.
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Appendix A
United States Price Indexes Since 1960'
GNP 	 PCE
	IMPLICIT PERCENT IMPLICIT PERCENT	 PERCENT
PRICE 	 ANNUAL 	 PRICE 	 ANNUAL 	 ANNUAL
YEAR DEFLATOR' INCREASE DEFLATOR' INCREASE CPP INCREASE
1960 68.70 1.6% 71.9 1.8% 88.7 1.6%
1961 69.33 0.9 72.6 1.0 89.6 1.0
1962 70.61 1.8 73.7 1.5 90.6 1.1
1963 71.67 1.5 74.8 1.5 91.7 1.2
1964 72.77 1.5 75.9 1.5 92.9 1.3
1965 74.36 2.2 77.2 1.7 94.5 1.7
1966 76.76 3.2 79.4 2.8 97.2 2.9
1967 79.06 3.0 81.4 2.5 100.0 2.9
1968 82.51 4.4 84.6 3.9 104.2 4.2
1969 86.74 5.1 88.4 4.5 109.8 5.4
1970 91.45 5.4 92.5 4.6 116.3 5.9
1971 96.01 5.0 96.5 4.3 121.4 4.4
1972 100.00 4.2 100.0 3.6 125.2 3.1
1973 105.69 5.7 105.7 5.7 133.1 6.3
1974 114.92 8.7 116.3 10.0 147.7 11.0
1975 125.56 9.3 125.2 7.7 161.2 9.1
1976 132.11 5.2 131.6 5.1 170.5 5.8
1977 139.83 5.8 139.5 6.0 181.5 6.5
1978 150.05 7.3 149.1 6.9 195.4 7.6
1979 162.77 8.5 162.3 8.9 217.4 11.5
1980 177.36 9.0 178.9 10.2 246.8 13.7
1981 193.64 9.2 193.8 8.3 272.4 10.4
Yearly figures represent annual averages of the indexes rather than year end figures.
The percent annual increase is the increase represented by the more recent annual average over
the immediately prior year's annual average.
2 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis Index (current quantities
in 1972 price - annual average figure).
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis Index (current quantities
in 1972 prices - annual average figure).
4 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Index (weighted quantities - 1972
weights - in 1967 prices, CPI-W prior to 1978, CPI-U for 1978 and subsequently - annual
average figure).
